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Executive Summary
Nanotherapeutics and in vivo nanodiagnostics are a subset 
of nanomedicine applications that includes drugs, biologi-
cal products, and implantable medical devices incorporat-
ing nanoscale materials. These nanomedicine products can 
enable new or improved treatments and diagnostics for 
many diseases and disorders. Human subjects research 
(HSR) on nanomedicine interventions is already under 
way, with a number of products approved for use. Such 
research is subject to existing federal and institutional 
oversight rules and regulations, including Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) rules on HSR for all FDA-regulated 
products and the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) Common Rule for HSR funded or con-
ducted by NIH or any of the other signatory agencies. 
Both of these regimes require HSR protocols to obtain 
approval from an Institutional Review Board (IRB), based 
on assessment of the ethical appropriateness of research 
on human participants. However, some nanomedicine 
HSR may raise safety and ethics concerns that pose chal-
lenges to the existing system of oversight and that may 
merit consideration of additional oversight. The concerns 
that may warrant additional oversight include marked 
uncertainty about hazard and risk to human subjects and 
about occupational exposures of researchers and lab 
workers, exposures of bystanders such as family mem-
bers, and environmental effects. 
Concerns posed by some nanomedicine HSR reflect 
the emergence of increasingly complex, active, and inter-
active products. These concerns also reflect the limits of 
an HSR oversight system developed over 30 years ago, 
with widely recognized problems and limitations. We are 
not arguing that the ethical issues raised by nanomedicine 
HSR are unique to that field and arise in no other domain 
of HSR for emerging science and technology. To the con-
trary, our recommendations regarding nanomedicine HSR 
offer an opportunity to examine the larger issue of the 
adequacy of the current HSR oversight system in the face 
of increasingly sophisticated science and technologies. 
This article presents the first published recom-
mendations on how to comprehensively approach the 
challenges raised by nanomedicine research in human 
beings. While some nanomedicine HSR requires no extra 
oversight, we suggest an oversight approach that can 
identify research that may need extra oversight, that can 
structure that extra oversight in a targeted way, and that 
can evolve with greater knowledge about nanomedicine 
materials and interventions. We recommend the forma-
tion of two complementary bodies: (1) an interagency 
group comprised of governmental officials, and (2) a 
federal advisory committee comprised of outside experts 
and stakeholders who can offer advice in a public forum. 
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Introduction
Nanomedicine is yielding new and improved treat-
ments and diagnostics for a range of diseases and dis-
orders. Nanomedicine applications incorporate mate-
rials and components with nanoscale dimensions 
(often defined as 1-100 nm, but sometimes defined to 
include dimensions up to 1000 nm, as discussed fur-
ther below) where novel physiochemical properties 
Creation of both bodies ensures the administrative 
power to coordinate among agencies while also having a 
forum for all stakeholders.
• An interagency Humans Subjects Research 
in Nanomedicine (HSR/N) Working Group 
should be established to coordinate among 
federal agencies and offices addressing nano-
medicine HSR oversight. We suggest that this 
HSR/N Working Group be housed within DHHS 
with member representatives from federal agencies 
and offices that are key to nanomedicine HSR.
• A Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Nano-
medicine (SAC/N) should additionally be 
established under the Federal Advisory Com-
mittee Act (FACA) to provide recommenda-
tions on sound approaches to nanomedicine 
human subjects research and a forum for public 
discussion. SAC/N may be created as a subcom-
mittee of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on 
Human Research Protections (SACHRP) or as a 
separate body. 
• HSR/N and SAC/N should initially serve (1) 
analytical, (2) advisory, and (3) information 
review functions. A fourth potential function, 
new federal protocol-by-protocol review (as was 
conducted in the past, for example, in the Recombi-
nant DNA Advisory Committee’s (RAC’s) review of 
human gene transfer protocols), does not appear to 
be warranted at this time. 
• For the purposes of nanomedicine HSR over-
sight and data collection, HSR/N and SAC/N 
in coordination with other nano-focused 
offices (including the Nanoscale Science, 
Engineering, and Technology Subcommit-
tee (NSET) and National Nanotechnology 
Initiative (NNI)) should consider how best to 
establish an interim definition of nanomedi-
cine, which may ultimately lead to a different 
approach, based on identifying key attributes 
of concern. Federal definitions of “nanotechnol-
ogy” in general have varied, though NNI’s definition 
focusing on functionalities engineered to emerge 
at dimensions of up to 100 nm has been most 
prominent. However, identifying “nanomedicine” 
products specifically for the purposes of HSR over-
sight raises somewhat different issues, calling for a 
more inclusive set of criteria in order to err on the 
side of capturing HSR concerns. It may be that any 
such definition should ultimately yield to a roster of 
relevant attributes of concern.1 Yet the creation of a 
roster of attributes of concern is difficult at present, 
given the state of scientific and toxicological knowl-
edge. HSR/N and SAC/N may thus need to start 
with a size-based definition, in keeping with the tra-
ditional commitment of HSR review to anticipating 
and preventing harm to human subjects. 
• Upon considering the recommendations of 
SAC/N, HSR/N should facilitate cross-agency 
coordination on a Points-to-Consider docu-
ment to help guide institutions and research-
ers crafting and overseeing protocols for nano-
medicine HSR. This Points-to-Consider document 
should articulate what information is needed to facili-
tate sound, science-based analysis of ethical and safety 
questions. It should also provide guidance for infor-
mation-gathering by institutional review bodies such 
as IRBs, Data and Safety Monitoring Boards (DSMBs), 
and committees responsible for occupational and 
environmental review of research protocols. 
Our recommendations avoid the creation of additional 
regulation for nanomedicine HSR as a class. Instead we rec-
ommend establishing a means to convene and coordinate 
federal oversight authorities for the purposes of setting 
priorities, collecting information, and building infrastructure 
for effective oversight of nanomedicine HSR, relying on 
inputs from top experts in the field and key stakeholders 
as nanomedicine progresses to more complex, active, and 
interactive interventions. HSR/N and SAC/N will provide 
governmental and public forums to address nanomedicine 
HSR issues as the science and HSR challenges evolve. This 
flexible approach will reduce the burden on individual 
agencies and oversight bodies to independently develop 
their own analyses and data sets, by instead facilitating a 
coordinated process among relevant agencies, institutions, 
and centers. This will reduce duplication of effort, help 
avoid gaps in analysis and oversight, and will ensure a more 
science-based approach to HSR oversight, thus avoiding 
unnecessary impediments to innovation. This flexible and 
evolutionary approach to HSR oversight, including con-
sideration of occupational, bystander, and environmental 
analysis, may provide a model for HSR oversight in other 
areas of emerging science and technology.
Recommendations for Nanomedicine HSR
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emerge as a result of size-dependent phenomena and 
high surface-to-mass ratio.2 Nanotherapeutics and in 
vivo nanodiagnostics are a subset of nanomedicine 
products that enter the human body. These include 
drugs, biological products (biologics), implantable 
medical devices, and combination products that are 
designed to function in the body in ways unachievable 
at larger scales. Nanotherapeutics and in vivo nano-
diagnostics incorporate materials that are engineered 
at the nanoscale to express novel properties that are 
medicinally useful. These nanomedicine applications 
can also contain nanomaterials that are biologically 
active, producing interactions that depend on bio-
logical triggers. Examples include nanoscale formu-
lations of insoluble drugs to improve bioavailability 
and pharmacokinetics, drugs encapsulated in hollow 
nanoparticles with the ability to target and cross cel-
lular and tissue membranes (including the blood-
brain barrier) and to release their payload at a specific 
time or location, imaging agents that demonstrate 
novel optical properties to aid in locating microme-
tastases, and antimicrobial and drug-eluting compo-
nents or coatings of implantable medical devices such 
as stents. 
As a group, nanomedicine products are not new. 
Some have been in use for years.3 However, over the 
last decade, products using active and interactive 
nanoparticles (rather than passive nanoparticles) 
have entered the development pipeline with testing in 
human subjects. A search of the literature in 2010, and 
since updated using search engines that track human 
trials, found 247 confirmed or likely nanomedicine 
products that were in human testing or had already 
gone through the HSR process.4 
Nanomedicine interventions that are undergoing 
testing in human beings are already subject to fed-
eral and institutional rules and oversight, as codi-
fied in the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) 
human subjects protection rules5 and the similar, 
but not identical, Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) Common Rule,6 subscribed to by 
multiple federal agencies. These rules guide Insti-
tutional Review Boards (IRBs), which are generally 
but not always housed at individual research insti-
tutions, in evaluating the ethical concerns posed by 
a research protocol, approving the adequacy of the 
protocol in addressing those concerns, and oversee-
ing the research over time. Under these rules, IRBs 
assess factors including: minimization of risks to 
participants; reasonableness of risk to participants 
in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to the par-
ticipant and the importance of knowledge reasonably 
expected to result from the research; informed con-
sent; and adequacy of data-monitoring.7 
Virtually all HSR on nanotherapeutics and in vivo 
nanodiagnostics is subject to the FDA’s authority to 
regulate human subjects research on drugs, devices, 
biologics, and combination products under the Fed-
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.8 The FDA ensures 
that HSR on products requiring FDA approval for 
marketing complies with FDA regulations.9 A consid-
erable portion of nanomedicine HSR is also subject to 
the Common Rule, which applies to all research con-
ducted or funded by DHHS, including the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), or any of the other agen-
cies that have adopted the Rule.10 The Common Rule 
also applies to research conducted at institutions ren-
dering a broad Federalwide Assurance (FWA) by com-
mitting to compliance with the Rule for a wider set 
of research projects conducted by those institutions.11 
The Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), 
a body that reports to the Office of the Assistant Sec-
retary for Health (OASH) in the DHHS Office of the 
Secretary,12 provides additional guidance on HSR. 
Under both the FDA and Common Rule regimes, 
IRBs function as the key body at the institutional level 
that is responsible for considering whether a proto-
col comports with the rules governing HSR. Under 
those rules, IRBs focus on protection of human par-
ticipants, rather than evaluating the scientific sound-
ness of a protocol, except as is necessary to determine 
whether the research has sufficient scientific merit to 
justify subjecting human participants to risk.13 Other 
review processes at both the FDA and NIH focus on 
evaluating scientific soundness. However, the FDA in 
particular also has extensive processes at the federal 
level for considering risks posed and the adequacy of 
proposed safeguards.
At the FDA, nanotherapeutics and in vivo nano-
diagnostics must undergo premarket testing and 
approval under either the New Drug Application 
(NDA) process for drugs14 or the Premarket Approval 
(PMA) process for medical devices.15 Product manu-
facturers must submit an Investigational New Drug 
(IND) application for drugs16 or Investigational 
Device Exemption (IDE) application for devices.17 
For devices, requirements differ according to whether 
the study poses a “significant risk” or “nonsignificant 
risk.”18 The FDA also has the authority to require the 
submission of additional data necessary to evaluate 
the safety of both INDs and IDEs. The FDA Nano-
technology Task Force notes that this “provides FDA 
with the ability to…assess the safety and, as applicable, 
effectiveness of products, including relevant effects of 
nanoscale materials.”19 
For research that is subject to the Common Rule, 
NIH requires that protocols undergo scientific peer 
review by a Scientific Review Group (SRG) before 
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being submitted to an IRB for review.20 An SRG 
assesses the scientific soundness of a protocol, includ-
ing consideration of “the adequacy of the proposed 
protection for humans, animals, and the environ-
ment, to the extent they may be adversely affected by 
the project proposed in the application.”21 
These FDA and Common Rule regimes constitute 
baseline federal oversight for HSR, with IRBs provid-
ing the baseline oversight at the institutional level. 
(States may have additional rules; we focus here on fed-
eral rules, the national system for protection of human 
subjects.) Some research activities conducted in the 
course of HSR, such as disposal of hazardous materials 
and laboratory practices, may also be subject to Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations 
at the federal level, as well as state and locally imposed 
occupational and environmental requirements. 
(Again, we focus here on federal requirements.) Insti-
tutions have occupational and environmental over-
sight bodies to review research protocols and ensure 
compliance with federal, state, and local rules. These 
occupational and environmental oversight processes 
typically occur in parallel to IRB review and may not 
significantly influence IRB decisions. The baseline sys-
tem of federal and institutional oversight for HSR, as 
well as the system for federal and institutional over-
sight for environmental and occupational protection in 
HSR, is depicted in Figure 1.
There is little specific guidance as yet on oversight for 
nanomedicine HSR protocols. NIH and OHRP have 
yet to issue guidance specific to SRG or IRB review 
of nanomedicine HSR, even though nanomedicine 
HSR is under way and the Recombinant DNA Advi-
sory Committee (RAC) at the Office of Biotechnology 
Activities (OBA) has already considered some human 
gene transfer research (often called “gene therapy”) 
protocols using nanotechnology.23 The FDA has been 
more active. In 2007, FDA’s Nanotechnology Task 
Force took the position that existing FDA authority 
was sufficient to adequately regulate nanomedicine, 
but recommended that the agency take steps including 
“[e]valuate the adequacy of current testing 
approaches”; “[i]ssue guidance to sponsors” on a 
number of topics; “[w]hen warranted, issue a call 
for data”; and “[a]ddress on a case-by-case basis 
whether labeling must or may contain information 
on the use of nanoscale materials.”24 In 2010, FDA’s 
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) 
issued an addition to its Manual of Policies and Proce-
Figure 1
Baseline System of Federal and Institutional Oversight of Human Subjects Research22
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dures (MAPP) requiring reviewers to verify accurate 
and complete documentation of particle type, size, 
agglomeration, solubility, and surface properties for 
all applications involving nanomaterials.25 The FDA 
has also issued guidance for industry, such as a draft 
2011 guidance on determining whether an FDA-reg-
ulated product involves nanotechnology for the pur-
poses of FDA deliberations on whether additional 
nanomedicine oversight is required.26 Despite FDA 
activity on nanomedicine submissions generally, the 
FDA has not issued guidance specifically on human 
subjects research challenges in nanomedicine. Simi-
larly, while EPA and the National Institute for Occu-
pational Safety and Health (NIOSH) have issued reg-
ulations and guidance on nanotechnology generally, 
they have not addressed nanomedicine HSR.27 
Even at the White House level, extensive atten-
tion to nanotechnology has not yielded guidance on 
nanomedicine HSR. The White House Office of Sci-
ence and Technology Policy (OSTP) oversees an active 
set of bodies considering nanotechnology issues, yet 
none of these has addressed the emerging human sub-
jects research issues. Under OSTP, the National Sci-
ence and Technology Council’s (NSTC) Committee on 
Technology oversees the Nanoscale Science, Engineer-
ing, and Technology (NSET) Subcommittee. NSET 
is supported by the National Nanotechnology Coor-
dination Office (NNCO) as part of the multi-agency 
National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI). NSET in 
turn has established four Working Groups on: Global 
Issues in Nanotechnology; Nanotechnology Environ-
mental and Health Implications; Nanomanufactur-
ing, Industry Liaison & Innovation; and Nanotechnol-
ogy Public Engagement & Communications. In 2011, 
the OSTP, together with the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Trade Representative 
(USTR), called for yet another working group, to focus 
on developing an approach to “choice of terminology 
relevant to the regulation and oversight of nanomate-
rials,” as well as to facilitate interagency coordination 
and involvement in nanotechnology research.28 The 
lack of a working group to focus specifically on HSR 
issues in nanomedicine highlights a significant gap in 
governmental oversight for nanomedicine, a gap that 
this article addresses.
Our group recommends creation of two comple-
mentary oversight bodies under DHHS: a Secretary’s 
Advisory Committee on Nanomedicine (SAC/N) to 
capture multiple stakeholder viewpoints and non-
governmental expertise on nanomedicine in a public 
forum, and a Human Subjects Research in Nanomedi-
cine (HSR/N) Working Group to facilitate coordina-
tion among regulating agencies, offices, and centers, 
taking into consideration SAC/N’s advice. Nanomedi-
cine is a complex field and significant expertise lies 
outside of the government, suggesting use of a Secre-
tary’s Advisory Committee. Additionally, nanomedi-
cine HSR may raise public concerns that would be 
appropriately addressed by having a public forum for 
discussion and transparency to engender public trust. 
However, consideration and utilization of SAC/N rec-
ommendations call for a structure that can react to 
and implement changes, such as an HSR/N Working 
Group. Placement of HSR/N within DHHS is appro-
priate given that the Secretary oversees FDA, NIH, 
and NIOSH, the main components of the current 
HSR regulatory structure. The Secretary should also 
reach out to invite entities such as OSHA and EPA to 
participate in the Working Group.
Creation of the HSR/N Working Group and SAC/N 
would facilitate coordinated consideration of emerg-
ing challenges posed by some HSR on nanomedicine. 
The same nanomaterial characteristics that enable 
new and superior nanomedicine applications may also 
raise some concerns about nanomedicine research in 
humans. Recently, the National Research Council 
(NRC) of the National Academies released a report 
suggesting the importance of identifying environ-
Our group recommends creation of two complementary oversight bodies 
under DHHS: a Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Nanomedicine (SAC/N) 
to capture multiple stakeholder viewpoints and non-governmental expertise 
on nanomedicine in a public forum, and a Human Subjects Research in 
Nanomedicine (HSR/N) Working Group to facilitate coordination among 
regulating agencies, offices, and centers, taking into consideration SAC/N’s 
advice. Nanomedicine is a complex field and significant expertise lies outside 
of the government, suggesting use of a Secretary’s Advisory Committee. 
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mental, health, and safety hazards of nanomaterials.29 
While not focused on HSR specifically, the report 
highlighted gaps in our understanding of potential 
human health and environmental reactions to com-
plex nanoparticles. These gaps have implications for 
nanomedicine. They affect establishment of safe dos-
ing levels of nanodrugs and the best animal models 
for testing particular types of nanomedicine products. 
Beyond highlighting gaps in technical knowledge 
about nanomaterials, the report also noted a need 
for a better approach to addressing nano properties 
and understanding “underlying biologic interactions 
that determine exposure and risk.”30 These findings 
were similar to the recommendations in a National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) 2011 report that also 
called for more research on the impact of nanomateri-
als on human health and the environment.31 The more 
recent assessment of NNI by the President’s Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) makes 
additional recommendations regarding efforts to con-
sider human health issues.32 
It is important to note from the outset that no docu-
mented cases yet show harm resulting to human sub-
jects from exposure to nanomaterials in the course of 
nanomedicine HSR. However, the system of protec-
tion for human participants in research was designed 
beginning in the late 1970s in order to review pro-
posed research protocols prophylactically to assess risk, 
decide whether risk is within acceptable limits, balance 
risk against expected benefits if any, ensure informed 
consent, and prevent harm.33 The fact that we see no 
documented cases yet of harm to humans from nano-
exposures in nanomedicine HSR stands to reason. 
Older forms of nanomedicine, such as the use of lipo-
somes in drug delivery, have primarily used nanotech-
nology to create vehicles for drug transport in a “pas-
sive” use of this technology. Moreover, nanotoxicology 
and other means of assessing risk and hazard have been 
in development. But the field of nanomedicine is evolv-
ing fast. More active, interactive, multi-modal uses of 
nanotechnology in medicinal products and diagnostics 
are emerging. Considering now how best to anticipate 
nanomedicine HSR issues is entirely in line with the 
overarching preventive goals of HSR oversight.34 
Considering the hazards and potential risks posed 
by some nanomedicine interventions, including the 
more complex and active materials emerging, is war-
ranted. Some of the great strengths and potential 
advantages of nanotherapeutics simultaneously pose 
challenges. Just as nanoscale size and properties can 
improve bioavailability and pharmacokinetics, they 
may also play a role in the toxicity and tissue distribu-
tion of nanoparticles.35 These characteristics can also 
stimulate or suppress immune responses in the body36 
or cause increased, decreased, or abnormal function 
of tissues and organs.37 Some studies suggest that par-
ticular nanomaterials may also have adverse repro-
ductive effects, including effects on the gametes.38 
Furthermore, studies have shown that some nanoma-
terials introduced into the body may be susceptible to 
horizontal transmission to bystanders and movement 
into the environment through biological shedding 
and waste excretion,39 and that manufacturing and 
handling of nanomedicine products or intermediates 
could expose researchers and lab workers to inhala-
tion or dermal absorption of nanoparticles.40 
These sources of concern are, of course, merely 
the starting point for the kind of analysis that should 
be spearheaded by the HSR/N Working Group and 
SAC/N that we suggest. FDA regulations on HSR and 
the Common Rule make no mention of the distinc-
tion between hazard (a source of potential risk) and 
actual risk. The HSR/N Working Group and SAC/N 
should strive to conduct a science-based analysis of 
nanomedicine HSR issues, make this distinction, and 
then progress to the questions of how much risk is 
posed, of what kind, what data support these conclu-
sions, and what HSR protections are needed. The data 
needed are currently still in development. Complicat-
ing the picture further, there remains a lack of con-
sensus within the toxicology community on the degree 
of accuracy with which conventional animal and in 
vitro toxicology models can assess the potential risks 
of some engineered nanomaterials, especially active 
and complex nanomaterials.41 Further disagreement 
exists on whether these methods are able to assess 
long-term metabolic fate and predict the potential 
for unintentional secondary interactions, as well as 
delayed immunological, inflammatory, and carcino-
genic effects.42 Complicating the picture further still, 
nanomedicine research in humans may raise concerns 
about hazard and risk not only to research partici-
pants, but also to researchers and workers, bystanders 
(such as family members and close contacts) who may 
be exposed to nanomaterials in the course of HSR, 
and the environment. 
These are potential concerns for many emerging 
technologies.43 Addressing these concerns in nano-
medicine HSR is a chance to do a better job than in 
the past to address HSR concerns raised by emerging 
technologies. Susan Wolf and Cortney Jones detail the 
somewhat chaotic history of responses to the HSR 
challenges raised by new domains of science and tech-
nology.44 A wide range of regimes have been created 
to provide extra or “exceptional” review for HSR. It is 
difficult to discern an overarching rhyme or reason. 
Moreover, the preexisting system of “baseline” human 
subjects review in this country is already widely recog-
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nized to be stressed and in need of repair.45 This article 
deliberately avoids creating yet another ad hoc regime 
of extra review. Instead, we take the more cautious 
and incremental step of creating two complementary 
oversight groups to coordinate analysis and data-
gathering in order to ultimately devise an approach 
to human subjects research oversight in nanomedi-
cine that is well grounded in both the ethics of human 
subjects review and the science of nanomedicine. This 
comports with the recent call for “a balanced, science-
based approach to regulating nanomaterials…in a 
manner that protects human health, safety, and the 
environment without prejudging new technologies or 
creating unnecessary barriers to…innovation.”46
We are not the first to consider nanomedicine HSR 
challenges. As Wolf and Jones have documented, a lit-
erature has begun to address the need for analysis and 
potential oversight for nanomedicine HSR.47 However, 
the HSR proposals to date have generally focused on 
narrow aspects of the problem, such as the role of the 
FDA or the need for additional risk data (see Figure 
2). In 2008, the President’s Council on Bioethics con-
sidered whether to launch analysis of nanotechnology 
issues, but ultimately declined. They explained that 
nanotechnology may indeed raise significant safety and 
other issues, but they were limiting their work to issues 
of “human dignity”: “[I]n order to begin…an investiga-
tion [by the President’s Council], the technology under 
question must…affect human dignity. Nanotechnolo-
gies that are currently available….might make people 
sick, and they might harm the natural environment…, 
but their current manifestations do not risk altering 
the very nature of being human…. [N]ew, more con-
crete advances might justify its reengaging the topic.”48 
Nanomedicine HSR oversight requires a system that 
can carefully differentiate interventions raising con-
cerns that may not be adequately addressed by baseline 
HSR oversight, from interventions that raise no such 
concerns. Different types of nanotherapeutics and in 
vivo nanodiagnostics present different environmental, 
health, and safety (EHS) risks of differing magnitudes, 
depending on a broad range of factors, including the 
type, size, shape, and complexity of the nanomaterial, the 
route of administration, and the biological elements with 
which the nanomaterial interacts once administered. For 
example, while some nanomedicine applications contain 
passive nanomaterials with fixed properties and func-
tionalities, others contain active nanostructures with 
complex properties and functions that can be triggered 
or changed by environmental stimuli.49 Consequently, 
while some nanomedicine applications are well char-
acterized and understood and require no extra analysis 
or oversight, others may present risks that are currently 
difficult to identify, challenging to assess, and potentially 
merit extra attention beyond the current baseline. 
Ensuring adequate HSR oversight for nanothera-
peutics and in vivo nanodiagnostics is important to 
protect the rights and welfare of research participants, 
researchers and lab workers, and bystanders, and to 
protect the environment, as well as to promote pub-
lic confidence in nanomedicine research and devel-
opment.50 It can also provide a starting point for the 
broader task of improving HSR oversight for sophis-
ticated and emerging technologies. We find no ethical 
issues that are entirely unique to nanomedicine human 
subjects research; other cutting-edge domains of HSR 
pose similar problems. It is precisely for this reason 
that nanomedicine HSR can serve as a model for 
improvement in analysis and oversight of HSR issues. 
The challenges in developing such oversight are (1) to 
avoid the creation of unnecessary regulatory hurdles 
that can stifle research and innovation, and (2) to cre-
ate a system that can handle the current level of uncer-
tainty surrounding some types of nanomedicine and 
adapt, as that level of uncertainty changes over time. 
Our recommendations consider the ethics of nano-
medicine HSR and protections for human subjects, 
as well as occupational, bystander, and environment 
safeguards. We break new ground by offering recom-
mendations for a coordinated approach to federal and 
institutional oversight of nanomedicine HSR that 
addresses this full range of concerns. We accomplish 
this in six ways:
1.  We recognize that not all categories of 
nanomedicine research pose the same 
type and seriousness of safety and ethical 
concerns. Our recommendations provide an 
oversight approach that differentiates among 
nanomedicine interventions in order to avoid 
the creation of unnecessary regulatory hurdles. 
2.  We focus both on strengthening the exist-
ing system of oversight and on addressing 
areas where new oversight may be needed. 
Our approach avoids proposing new require-
ments unless found to be necessary. We 
suggest a way to ascertain the need for new 
requirements over time.
3.  We go beyond safety and ethical concerns 
for the human subject to address occupa-
tional, bystander, and environmental con-
cerns. The existing system of HSR oversight 
focuses on the human subject. Our recom-
mendations broaden the scope of oversight 
to include consideration of other potentially 
affected parties and environmental concerns.
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Figure 2
Inventory of Major Proposed Approaches to Oversight of Nanomedicine Human Subjects Research, 2007-2011 











•  Recommends when developing high-tech nanoproducts that social and ethical 
issues are taken into account, by using design framework that focuses on values 
and requirements of moral import.
•  Design framework helps to reconcile opposing values in engineering design, such 
as safety versus efficacy. 
2011 Wolf & Jones187 Standing federal 
guidance body
•  Recommends creation of federal body or institution to provide guidance for 
nanomedicine research.
•  Body provides standing source of advice on nanomedicine when local IRBs seek 
additional expertise for nanoproducts.
2010 Bawa188 New FDA center •  Recommends creation of a new center at FDA specifically for handling nanoproducts.
•  Along with a new Center, either new regulations or amended regulations should 
be created that take into account nano-specific properties.
2009 Fadeel & Garcia-
Bennett189
Individual  
assessment of new 
nanomaterials
•  When a new nanomaterial is tested or a previously tested nanomaterial is altered 
in size, an individual assessment of the new particle should be conducted.
•  Recommends increased preclinical studies and studies that examine nano-effects, 
such as bioaccumulation.
2009 Harris190 Risk and char-
acteristic-based 
regulation
•  FDA currently faces difficulty classifying certain nanoproducts’ primary mode of  
action, but nano risks result from unique characteristics displayed by particles.
•  Nanoproducts should be classified based on risks and nano-characteristics of products.
•  FDA should receive increased funding to ensure sufficient nano experts to  
review applications.
2009 Hoet et al.191 Individual  
assessment of 
new nanoproducts
•  Increasingly complex products justify a case-by-case approach to hazard identifi-
cation, based on the unique characteristics of the material.
•  The risk assessment framework should be reformed to take account of height-
ened risks.





•  Recommends heightened requirements for in vivo and ex vivo research before 
clinical research is approved.
•  Emphasize unpredictable risks for newer materials in risk/benefit analysis.
•  Make sure that subjects receive all details of studies, including information on 
risks, benefits, and confidentiality.
2008 DeVille193 Central  
repository of 
nano-studies
•  A central repository should be created, in which all medical uses of substances 
are documented and analyzed (registry studies). 
•  Studies should be aimed at documenting harmful characteristics of nanoparticles.




•  Existing guidelines from other emergent technology areas such as genetics 
should be used as a basis for producing additional ethical guidelines. 
•  Guidelines should be aimed at protecting human dignity and integrity in nano-research.
2008 Virdi195 Multi-criterion  
decision analysis
•  Based on a model by Linkov et al., multi-criterion decision analysis involves  
assessing a product’s risks, the relative riskiness of alternative therapies, and the 
effects of therapy in assessing the acceptability of studies.





expanded view of 
risks
•  In animal studies, testing standards and results should be heightened.
•  Researchers should expand the roster of risks they consider when designing 
clinical trials to include (1) long-term outcomes, (2) toxicity, (3) new nano-effects, 
and (4) the probability of occasional but catastrophic events.





•  Data and Safety Monitoring Boards (DSMBs) should be used to track adverse 
events, reactions, and unanticipated toxicity.
•  Physicians should be required to report adverse events relevant to products, 
even after approval.
•  Additional long-term studies are needed, following clinical trials.
•  Communication with participants should be expanded if the study involves a  
material not well-studied.
•  Risk communication with the public is necessary during clinical trials.
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4.  We anticipate the increasing complexity 
of nanomedicine applications over time. 
While many nanomedicine applications today 
incorporate passive nanomaterials with fixed 
functionalities and more easily characterized 
properties, we recognize that nanomedicine 
innovation is moving in the direction of active 
nanosystems with more complex properties 
and functions. While passive nanomaterials 
can raise HSR issues, the more active and 
advanced forms of nanomedicine are likely to 
present new safety and ethical concerns with 
greater levels of uncertainty.
5.  We provide recommendations for coordi-
nated oversight across federal and institu-
tional oversight bodies. Nanomedicine HSR 
protection, including protection for research-
ers and lab workers, bystanders, and the envi-
ronment, spans the jurisdiction and author-
ity of multiple oversight bodies, both at the 
federal and institutional levels. Coordination 
among these bodies is critical for reducing the 
cost and burden on individual agencies, avoid-
ing the risk of duplication or gaps in oversight, 
and maximizing the amount of data and infor-
mation available to each body.
6.  We provide an adaptive and flexible 
approach to oversight through creation of 
an HSR/N Working Group and SAC/N. As 
new data and knowledge about nanomate-
rial risks become available over time, and as 
increasingly complex nanomedicine applica-
tions are developed, it may become necessary 
to ratchet up or down oversight for nanomedi-
cine HSR. Our approach provides an ongoing 
process of data-gathering and deliberation 
designed to allow oversight to evolve.
Part I of this paper provides our recommendation for 
an approach to identifying “nanomedicine” interven-
tions for the purposes of developing HSR oversight. In 
Part II, we describe the characteristics of some nano-
medicine HSR that may give rise to safety and ethical 
challenges potentially meriting additional oversight 
beyond the current baseline system, and suggest how 
to address those concerns. In Part III, we provide 
our recommendations for a flexible and evolutionary 
approach to the oversight of nanomedicine human 
subjects research, including creation of an HSR/N 
Working Group and SAC/N advisory body. 
Methods
This paper grows out of a 3-year project on “Nanodi-
agnostics and Nanotherapeutics: Building Research 
Ethics and Oversight,” funded by an American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) Challenge 
grant from the National Human Genome Research 
Institute (NHGRI) at NIH. The project convened 
a multidisciplinary Working Group of academic 
and industry experts on nanomedicine, drug and 
device development, human gene transfer, HSR, and 
research oversight. The project analyzed challenges 
to HSR ethics and oversight posed by nanotherapeu-
tics and nanodiagnostics by integrating empirical, 
normative, and policy approaches. Investigators and 
Research Assistants (RAs) researched whether and 
to what extent federal authorities and funders, key 
research institutions, researchers, and professional 
societies relevant to nanomedicine are addressing 
questions of HSR ethics in nanomedicine. Investiga-
tors and RAs also conducted an assessment of federal 
research oversight through review of the scientific, 
medical, legal, and bioethics literature on current 
FDA, NIH, and other federal oversight approaches 
germane to nanomedicine research; reviewed rele-
vant statutes, regulations, guidance documents, and 
interpretive documents issued by FDA, NIH, and 
other key legal sources; and reviewed FDA, NIH, and 
other pertinent websites for publicly available mate-
rials relevant to human trials of nanodiagnostics and 
nanotherapeutics. 
Over the course of the project, we held five Work-
ing Group meetings to discuss project findings and 
to deliberate on these recommendations. Our Work-
ing Group also formed four “small groups” focusing 
on issues identified as needing further and deeper 
consideration: (1) core risks posed by some nanoma-
terials; (2) challenges posed by first-in-human trials 
in nanomedicine; (3) protection of human subjects 
in nanomedicine trials; and (4) nanomedicine HSR 
issues beyond the purview of the Common Rule (occu-
pational, bystander, and environmental risks and 
safeguards). In September 2011, we hosted a day-long 
national conference in Minneapolis, during which 
we presented our recommendations to an audience 
of invited stakeholders and experts, plus academics, 
policymakers, regulators, and members of the public, 
in order to elicit feedback. We then revised our recom-
mendations in light of that feedback. Final revisions 
were negotiated by e-mail. While the analysis and 
recommendations below are the product of the con-
sensus process undertaken by this multidisciplinary 
author group, individual co-authors may not fully 
endorse each and every recommendation. However, 
all authors have signed off on this article as a state-
ment of our group’s conclusions. 
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Part I. Defining or Describing Nanomedicine 
for Human Subjects Research Oversight
One of the most vexing issues in nanotechnology over-
sight generally has been how to define or describe 
what is meant by “nanotechnology.” We begin our 
discussion there, to indicate what we mean by “nano-
medicine.” Developing effective HSR guidance and 
oversight for nanomedicine protocols will require that 
all stakeholders know what area of HSR is being ref-
erenced. This does not mean that the entire domain 
of nanomedicine should be treated the same from an 
HSR perspective; it should not, as we acknowledge 
repeatedly below. 
“Nanotechnology” has proven challenging to define. 
While agencies have created various definitions based 
upon a mix of criteria regarding particle size and 
properties, we may not yet know enough about the 
mix of particle characteristics that actually raise con-
cerns to create a strict definition.51 The concern over 
any definition that focuses on particle size is that it 
shifts attention away from nanomaterial characteris-
tics, such as reactivity, that are more relevant to risk 
calculation;52 the characteristics that raise concerns 
are not size itself, but properties demonstrated by 
certain nanoparticles. There is considerable debate 
over whether the best and most science-sensitive 
approach may ultimately be to forego a definition of 
“nanotechnology,” in favor of specifying those attri-
butes of a product or material that raise well-founded 
concerns.53 
The task of defining nanotechnology has thus 
far rested largely with the National Nanotechnol-
ogy Initiative (NNI), an important federal program 
overseen by the cabinet-level National Science and 
Technology Council (NSTC), which is guided by the 
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) at 
the White House. NNI was established in 2000 to 
coordinate the nanotechnology-related activities of 
25 federal departments and agencies, including FDA, 
NIH, EPA, and OSHA.54 Coordination and strate-
gic planning of NNI activities is the responsibility of 
the Nanoscale Science, Engineering, and Technol-
ogy (NSET) Subcommittee of NSTC’s Committee 
on Technology, with membership from each of the 
NNI participating departments and agencies.55 The 
current NNI definition of nanotechnology is “the 
understanding and control of matter at dimensions 
between approximately 1 and 100 nanometers, where 
unique phenomena enable novel applications.”56 This 
definition has been the dominant one at the federal 
level, but it is not the only federal approach, as indi-
cated in Figure 3. 
The diversity of approaches evident in Figure 3 may 
reflect the reality that different agencies are search-
ing for a definition or approach for different regula-
tory and oversight purposes. Much of nanotechnology 
research in fields such as materials science and chem-
istry focuses on exploiting the novel physiochemi-
cal properties (e.g., mechanical, optical, and thermal 
properties) of nanoscale materials used in products 
that are intended to interact with biological systems.57 
Because these novel properties are often seen at the 1 
to 100 nanometer scale, the NNI definition may make 
sense for these areas of research. Yet, because nano-
medicine specifically involves the interaction between 
nanomaterials and human physiology, in vivo thera-
peutic and diagnostic applications can operate at 
somewhat larger scales.58
A significant challenge that regulatory agencies 
face in defining “nanomedicine” for oversight pur-
poses is that some drugs that are not regarded as 
raising nanotechnology challenges actually con-
tain nanoscale particles or target the body’s own 
nanoscale structures.59 For example, an aspirin mol-
ecule is approximately 0.75 nm in diameter,60 and a 
molecule of the common beta-blocker propranolol 
can fit inside a receptor with an area between 0.53 
and 0.64 square nms.61 However, research involv-
ing in vivo nanotherapeutics differs from research 
involving these conventional drugs. Conventional 
drug research focuses on the chemical interaction 
between drugs and target cells, receptors, or proteins 
(i.e., pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics), and 
conventional device research focuses on the mechan-
ical interaction between devices and target tissues, 
organs, and systems. Nanotherapeutics, however, 
can operate both chemically and mechanically.62 
Consider, for example, a hollow nanoshell impreg-
nated with a chemotherapy drug that is designed to 
break open and release its payload when exposed to 
infrared light administered externally. Such an appli-
cation acts both mechanically (the breaking open of 
the nanoshell) and chemically (the action of the che-
motherapy drug when released). Such an application 
has a broader set of therapeutic functions, as well as 
potential associated risks, than conventional drugs.
The FDA has begun to grapple with the need to 
develop a more deliberate approach to nano prod-
ucts. In 2010, FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research (CDER) issued an addition to its Manual of 
Policies and Procedures (MAPP) requiring chemistry, 
manufacturing, and controls (CMC) reviews to verify 
accurate and complete documentation of particle type, 
size, agglomeration, solubility, and surface properties 
for all applications involving nanomaterials, defined 
as “any material with at least one dimension smaller 
than 1,000 [nanometers].”63 The MAPP definition is 
for the purposes of gathering data on nanomaterials 
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Agency Definition/Approach
FDA In June 2011, FDA released for comment a draft guidance document indicating that:
“[W]hen considering whether an FDA-regulated product contains nanomaterials or otherwise involves the  
applications of nanotechnology, FDA will ask:
1.   Whether an engineered material or end product has at least one dimension in the nanoscale range  
(approximately 1 nm to 100 nm); or
2.   Whether an engineered material or end product exhibits properties or phenomena, including physical 
or chemical properties or biological effects that are attributable to its dimension(s), even if these 
dimensions fall outside the nanoscale range, up to one micrometer.”198
The FDA has stated that it “has not established its own formal definition, though the agency participated in the development 
of the NNI definition of ‘nanotechnology.’ Using that definition, nanotechnology relevant to the FDA might include research 
and technology development that both satisfies the NNI definition and relates to a product regulated by FDA.”199
FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) describes nanomaterials in its Manual of Policies and  
Procedures (MAPP) as “any material with at least one dimension smaller than 1,000 [nanometers].”200
NIH NIH defines nanotechnology as “the understanding and control of matter at dimensions of roughly 1 to 
100 nanometers, a scale at which unique properties of materials emerge that can be used to develop novel  
technologies and products.”201
NIH’s National Cancer Institute (NCI) describes nanotechnology as “the interactions of cellular and molecular  
components and engineered materials – typically clusters of atoms, molecules and molecular fragments – at the most  
elemental level of biology. Such nanoscale objects – typically, though not exclusively, with dimensions 
smaller than 100 nanometers – can be useful by themselves or as part of larger devices containing multiple  
nanoscale objects.”202 
Beginning in 2004, NCI’s requests for grant applications for Centers of Cancer Nanotechnology Excellence and  
Cancer Nanotechnology Platform Partnerships have provided that qualifying research must involve “[d]evices or 
base materials…smaller than 1000 nm in size although the assembly, synthesis, and/or fabrication of 
components of these final structures at dimensions less than 300 nm should be demonstrated.”203 
According to the NIH’s National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS), “[n]anoscale materials are  
defined as a set of substances where at least one dimension is less than approximately 100 
nanometers.”204
EPA “While many definitions for nanotechnology exist, EPA uses the NNI definition. The NNI calls it ‘nanotechnology’ only 
if it involves all of the following: 
1.   Research and technology development at the atomic, molecular or macromolecular levels, in the length scale 
of approximately 1 - 100 nanometer range. 
2.   Creating and using structures, devices and systems that have novel properties and functions because of 
their small and/or intermediate size. 
3.   Ability to control or manipulate on the atomic scale.”205 
The Office of Pesticide Program’s working definition of “nanoscale materials” is “[a]n ingredient that contains  
particles that have been intentionally produced to have at least one dimension that measures between 
approximately 1 and 100 nanometers.”206
OSHA OSHA defines nanotechnology as “the understanding, manipulation, and control of matter at dimensions 
of roughly 1 to 100 nanometers, which is near-atomic scale, to produce new materials, devices, and structures” 
and “engineered nanoscale materials or nanomaterials” as “ materials that have been purposefully manufactured, 
synthesized, or manipulated to have a size with at least one dimension in the range of approximately 1 
to 100 nanometers and that exhibit unique properties determined by their size.”207 
NIOSH NIOSH defines nanotechnology with reference to the NNI definition and further provides clarification on potential 
definitions for “nano-objects,” “ultrafine particles,” “engineered nanoparticles,” and “nanoaerosol,” all with reference to 
a dimensional scale of 1 to 100 nanometers.208
NRC In lieu of an actual definition, the NRC identifies engineered nanomaterials (ENM) with reference to “principles that 
help to identify emergent, plausible, and severe risks resulting from designing and engineering materials at the  
nanoscale….  The principles are built on three concepts: emergent risk, plausibility, and severity.”209
Figure 3 
FDA, NIH, EPA, OSHA, NIOSH, and NRC Definitions of “Nanotechnology” (emphases added)
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to inform future deliberations on whether additional 
guidance or regulation is necessary for nanoprod-
ucts.64 In addition, FDA issued a 2011 draft guidance 
for comment, stating that:
In the absence of a bright line as to where an 
upper [dimensional] limit should be set, the 
agency considers that an upper bound of one 
micrometer (i.e., 1,000 nm) would serve as a 
reasonable parameter for screening materials 
with dimensions beyond the nanoscale range 
for further examination to determine whether 
these materials exhibit properties or phenomena 
attributable to their dimension(s) and relevant 
to nanotechnology. The agency believes that the 
one micrometer upper limit…serves both to (1) 
exclude macro-scaled materials that may have 
properties attributable to their dimension(s) 
but are not likely relevant to nanotechnology; 
and (2) include those materials (such as aggre-
gates, agglomerates, or coated, functionalized, 
or hierarchically assembled structures) with 
dimension(s) above 100 nm that may exhibit 
dimension-dependent properties or phenomena 
relevant to nanotechnology and distinct from 
those of macro-scaled materials.65 
Thus, the FDA has suggested a broader definition 
of “nanotechnology” in the context of nanomedicine 
review to capture more data potentially relevant to 
development of effective oversight. This wider net is 
particularly appropriate in the context of an oversight 
system to protect human subjects. 
As noted above, use of a size parameter is not with-
out controversy. The recent National Research Coun-
cil report refrained from using size to define nanoen-
gineered materials, arguing that focus on “particle size 
may highlight issues that are not relevant while shift-
ing attention from such properties as reactivity that 
may be more relevant to determining risks.”66 This 
approach seems consistent with Andrew Maynard’s 
call for identifying nine to ten “attributes (including 
size and surface area) for which certain values trigger 
action.”67
After considerable debate, our project recommends 
a 2-step approach, involving initial use of a size 
parameter until more is known about nanoparticle 
properties and an attribute-based approach can be 
established. Determining the exact cutoff point for the 
initial size-based definition is a difficult issue. While 
the recent FDA approach uses 1000 nm to attempt 
to capture any and all substances with potential nano 
effects, such a high cutoff point captures many extra-
neous products. NNI and early FDA definitional 
approaches that use 100 nm exclude many nano-
products that show unique physiochemical effects 
at somewhat larger scales.68 For example, cancer 
research protocols include 150 nm investigative gold 
nanoshells for thermal cancer therapy.69 In addition, 
bioavailability may be increased by larger nanopar-
ticles, with liposomes of 150-200 nm remaining in 
the blood stream longer than those of 70 nm in size.70 
There is a distinct clustering of nanoproduct size in 
the 1 to 200 nm range and a significant number of 
investigational and commercial nano-components 
have the size of 200 to 300 nm, including a number 
of liposomes.71 Michael Etheridge and colleagues use 
a cutoff of 300 nm to encompass the unique prop-
erties of current nanomedicine applications while 
accounting for bioavailability and other nano-specific 
physiological behavior. A cutoff of 300 nm allows for 
the inclusion of particles smaller than 100 nm while 
not eliminating large nanoparticles demonstrating 
unique nano-related characteristics at 200 nm or 
slightly larger. 
One of the first tasks that should be undertaken by 
our proposed HSR/N Working Group is coordination 
of a harmonized approach to the definition or descrip-
tion of nanomedicine that is both science-based and 
sensitive to the goals of human subjects research 
review and oversight. The working group created by 
the June 2011 memo issued by OSTP, OMB, and USTR 
may be a great help, as a core task envisioned for that 
body is coordinating interagency work on terminol-
ogy.72 That memo shows sensitivity to the pitfalls of 
formulating a categorical definition of nanotechnol-
ogy with a size cutoff, suggesting that as scientific 
knowledge advances, what may ultimately prove more 
The FDA has suggested a broader definition of “nanotechnology” in the 
context of nanomedicine review to capture more data potentially relevant to 
development of effective oversight. This wider net is particularly appropriate 
in the context of an oversight system to protect human subjects. 
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useful is a “focus on novel properties and phenomena 
observed in nanomaterials.”73 
Yet the efforts of the new OSTP/OMB/USTR work-
ing group to develop a sound approach to the termi-
nology surrounding “nanotechnology” requires input 
on the special concerns surrounding human subjects 
research in nanomedicine. Our proposed SAC/N and 
HSR/N groups can gather and coordinate that input 
among the agencies and offices involved in human 
subjects research and its oversight. The two bodies we 
propose can also bring the goals of human subjects 
research oversight to bear in accepting or suggest-
ing modification of the OSTP/OMB/USTR working 
group’s terminology, much as FDA has found it neces-
sary to cast a wider definitional net than the NNI defi-
nition might suggest, in order to gather data on nano-
medicine products. Thus, we propose the following:
1.  HSR/N and SAC/N in coordination with 
other federal authorities involved in nano-
medicine HSR should develop an approach 
to the definition or description of nano-
medicine products that will serve the goals 
of human subjects research oversight. 
2.  While the science is developing to support 
identification of attributes that should trig-
ger regulatory concern at certain values, 
it may be necessary to rely in part on an 
approximate size cutoff. We see work at 
FDA and NIH (two of the lead agencies on 
human subjects research) that would suggest 
temporary use of a dimensional criterion, 
which could be 100 nm, 300 nm, or 1000 
nm. Because the goal in reviewing nano-
therapeutics and in vivo diagnostics is in part 
protection of human subjects in research, we 
suggest casting a wide definitional net for 
now in information-gathering and analysis. 
This argues for an inclusive dimensional 
criterion, such as the 1000 nm cutoff that 
the FDA MAPP document has used for 
information-gathering.
3.  Thus, nanomedicine would include drugs, 
devices, and biologics with one dimension 
roughly at the chosen nanometer size or 
smaller that exhibit either physiological 
properties (including shape dispersibility, 
surface charge, and surface reactivity) or 
biological interactions (including protein 
adsorption, barrier penetration, cellular 
uptake, aggregation, degradation, and 
pathway signaling) emerging at this scale. 
4.  However, we suggest that this approach 
using a size cutoff should be temporary, 
with the goal of moving toward a more 
attribute-based approach, as the science 
develops to support that and the OSTP/OMB/
USTR working group terminology effort 
progresses.
Part II. Safety and Ethical Challenges of 
Nanomedicine Human Subjects Research
Under FDA rules on HSR and the Common Rule, pro-
tocols for nanomedicine HSR must receive approval 
from an IRB based on criteria including:
•  minimization of risks to subjects;
•  reasonable risk to subjects in relation to antici-
pated benefits, if any, and the importance of 
knowledge reasonably expected to result from 
the research;
•  informed consent from the subject;
•  adequate data-monitoring; and
•  protection of subjects’ privacy and the confiden-
tiality of data.
IRB approval based on these criteria constitutes a key 
part of the baseline system for HSR oversight depicted 
in Figure 1. Baseline IRB review is effective for evalu-
ating most HSR protocols, but has two key limitations 
that challenge its adequacy for some areas of research. 
First, IRBs need enough reliable information about 
a protocol’s risks to be able to decide whether those 
risks are acceptable and minimized. This means that 
an IRB must have enough information, including data 
from bench and animal trials, to identify the types of 
risks posed, their potential severity, and their likeli-
hood of occurring, in order to evaluate whether the 
risks are minimized and reasonable in relation to 
anticipated benefits, if any.74 The second limitation 
is that IRBs typically focus on the acceptability of a 
protocol for the human subject, but do not provide 
robust consideration of occupational, bystander, or 
environmental concerns. This narrow focus is sup-
ported by commentators who argue that IRBs lack the 
time, resources, and expertise, as well as the statutory 
authority to address issues beyond the human subject 
and that these concerns are generally addressed ade-
quately by other oversight mechanisms such as EPA 
and OSHA regulations.75 However, concerns for work-
ers, bystanders, and the environment often factor into 
societal acceptability of scientific research even when 
the research could produce valuable outcomes. 
As a consequence of these limitations, some domains 
of HSR that present uncertain or difficult-to-assess 
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risks to human subjects and concerns about occupa-
tional, bystander, and environmental risks (such as 
human gene transfer research involving recombinant 
DNA) have been identified as requiring “exceptional” 
HSR oversight — oversight involving additional sub-
stantive and procedural rules designed to deal with 
the inadequacies of the baseline system.76 Protocols for 
HSR on human gene transfer, for example, are subject 
to the basic oversight depicted in Figure 1, as well as 
additional exceptional oversight depicted in Figure 4. 
As Figure 4 shows, such protocols require FDA and 
IRB approval, and must also be registered with the 
NIH’s Office of Biotechnology Activities (OBA). They 
are reviewed by OBA’s Recombinant DNA Advisory 
Committee (RAC), which assesses whether the pro-
tocol raises “important scientific, medical, ethical, or 
social issues that warrant in-depth discussion at the 
RAC’s quarterly public meetings.”77 The RAC also 
advises OBA and the Office of the Director at NIH 
about oversight needs it has identified in the course of 
its reviews. NIH guidelines further require that these 
gene therapy protocols receive institutional review by 
an Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), including 
consideration of occupational, bystander, and environ-
mental concerns.78 Figure 5 identifies this and other 
categories of HSR receiving exceptional oversight. 
Some nanomedicine research, such as research 
on non-viral nano-vectors for human gene transfer, 
already falls under an existing area of exceptional 
oversight and, as a result, receives additional oversight 
now. However, other areas of nanomedicine research 
may also present similar challenges to basic HSR 
oversight, but are not covered by any existing excep-
tional oversight regime. In this section, we identify 
safety and ethical concerns that some nanomedicine 
applications may pose for HSR oversight and provide 
recommendations for how these challenges can be 
addressed by federal and institutional oversight bod-
ies. We first provide a more detailed overview of why 
some nanomedicine applications may present addi-
tional risk-related challenges for HSR oversight. We 
then discuss how these specific challenges may affect 
IRB consideration of first-in-human (FIH) research 
and risk-benefit analysis, informed consent, and data 
monitoring. Finally, we discuss how some nanomedi-
cine HSR can present occupational, bystander, and 
environmental concerns meriting oversight beyond 
the basic FDA rules and Common Rule.
Figure 4
Baseline and Exception Oversight for the Example of Human Gene Transfer Research79
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A. Nanomedicine Risks
To evaluate what kind of challenge nanomedicine is 
presenting to HSR oversight, Etheridge and colleagues 
from our project group conducted a search and analy-
sis of the relevant nanomedicine and nanotoxicology 
literature, including inventorying all nanomedicine 
applications that are currently in or have already com-
pleted HSR.80 This research revealed more than 247 
confirmed or likely nanomedicine products that are in 
human subjects research or approved for market use. 
(Note that this analysis used a dimensional cutoff of 
300 nm for the biological and physiological reasons 
discussed above in Part I, though the paper separately 
analyzes “nanomedicine” claims up to 2000 nm.) The 
authors further found that 4 of the 5 most prevalent 
types of investigational and approved nanomedicine 
applications involve direct human exposure, most 
often through injection or implantation. Addition-
ally, they found that the most significant portion of 
nanomedicine research and commercialization is in 
the area of cancer therapy and other drug delivery. 
There are two likely reasons for this. First, a signifi-
cant portion of conventional drugs, most notably che-
motherapy drugs, demonstrate poor solubility and, 
as a result, poor bioavailability and dose response.81 
Second, many of these same drugs, including che-
motherapy drugs, produce significant side effects in 
patients associated with their broad distribution in 
the body and toxic effects on healthy tissues.82 Conse-
quently, many researchers developing new drugs are 
looking to nanotechnology to improve the bioavail-
ability and targeting of these drugs. Etheridge et al. 
also found that there is considerable research in the 
area of multi-functional nanomedicine applications 
that serve multiple therapeutic or diagnostic functions 
or that change functionalities in response to biological 
or external triggers.
Identifying hazard and ultimately risk characteris-
tics associated with these applications is a challeng-
ing task. The nano-components in these applications 
include a great variety of materials and structures, 
some of which are passive with fixed functionality and 
others that are active with functionalities that are trig-
gered or changed by internal or environmental stim-
uli.83 The hazards and risks associated with these dif-
ferent types of interventions and materials can further 
depend on the characteristics of the nanoparticles 
themselves (e.g., size, composition, surface chemis-
try), the behaviors of the nanoparticles in biological 
systems (e.g., protein adsorption, barrier penetration, 
cellular uptake, aggregation, degradation, pathway sig-
naling, and toxicity), and the route through which the 
nanoparticles are introduced into the body (e.g., oral 
ingestion, parenteral administration, topical applica-
tion, and implantation). Indeed, for many individual 
types of nanomedicine applications there is a consid-
Figure 5
Categories of Human Subjects Research that Are Subject to Added Oversight (adapted from Wolf and 
Jones, 2011)210
Exceptional Category Additional Oversight Required
Human Gene Transfer and 
Recombinant DNA Research
Local IRB review, plus review by the RAC at NIH and by the Center for Biologics Evaluation and 
Research (CBER) at FDA. NIH also requires review by an IBC.
Pediatric Research Certain forms of pediatric research require review by federal 407 panels convened by OHRP 
under 45 C.F.R. §46.407.
Emergency Interventions Research involving emergency interventions to which the human subject cannot consent in ad-
vance requires application of special IRB rules, satisfaction of certain OHRP requirements, compli-
ance with FDA rules on emergency research (if applicable), and establishment of an independent 
Data and Safety Monitoring Board (DSMB).
Fetal Tissue Transplantation Requires signed statement from woman terminating pregnancy, the physician performing the pro-
cedure, and the researcher under 42 U.S.C.S. §289g-1.
Intentional Dosing with 
Pesticides
Requires central review at EPA and use of an independent Human Studies Review Board (HSRB).
Dual Use Research of  
Concern (DURC)
DURC is subject to oversight by federal departments and agencies; National Science Advisory 
Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) advises on policy.
Radioactive Drugs Human research using a radioactive drug or biological product must receive approval from the 
FDA Radioactive Drug Research Committee (RDRC) under 21 C.F.R. §361.1.211
Synthetic Biology Both the RAC and NSABB have addressed additional oversight.
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erable literature dealing with potential EHS risks. In 
many instances, hazard and risk characteristics result 
from the same properties that make a nanomedicine 
application beneficial because (1) the very purposes of 
using nanoscale components is to exploit the ability 
of these components to access otherwise impenetrable 
areas of the body or to exploit the novel physiochemi-
cal properties that emerge at the nanoscale, and (2) 
these same nanoscale functionalities also present toxi-
cological and environmental fate and transport haz-
ards and risks that are widely recognized though, in 
many instances, poorly understood. 
While size, composition, and surface chemistry 
enable improved pharmacokinetics and bioavail-
ability, they can also play a role in the toxicity of 
nanoparticles.84 Although a number of reports have 
elucidated interactions with cells in vitro and tissues 
and organs in vivo,85 the clinical significance of these 
effects remain uncertain. It is particularly difficult 
to assess long-term biological consequences of these 
particles in the body and to predict the potential for 
unintentional secondary interactions or immunologi-
cal, inflammatory, or carcinogenic effects, which may 
take months or years to appear.86 High nanoparticle 
content in biological wastes excreted by research sub-
jects also has been cited as a source of concern because 
of potential exposure to bystanders and the environ-
ment.87 Yet clearly, at least the acute side effects of 
existing nanoparticulate agents such as Doxil™ (e.g., 
complement activation) have been characterized and 
dealt with through the usual preclinical and clinical 
trial evaluation methodologies. For these earlier ver-
sions of nanomaterials in clinical use, few deleterious 
consequences have been uncovered.
Still, the need to fully consider acute and chronic 
side effects of novel nanostructures is mandated by 
FDA guidance, as it is for all new interventions. How-
ever, there is a lack of consensus in the toxicology com-
munity as to the accuracy of conventional toxicological 
tests applied to nanoscale materials.88 Several reports 
have highlighted this lack of certainty regarding nano-
material risks89 and have suggested that traditional 
risk management frameworks need to have a mecha-
nism for incorporating new toxicological data when 
making decisions.90 Specifically, some scholars report 
that animal models used to assess risks in humans may 
not be effective for nanomaterials because of differ-
ences in how nanomaterials are absorbed, distributed, 
metabolized, and excreted by humans and animals.91 
Similar concerns exist regarding in vitro assays and 
general mechanisms for identifying exposure routes 
and effects of nanomaterials in the human body and 
environment.92 These problems have given rise to a 
branch of toxicology devoted to nanotoxicology that 
is concerned with nanoscale risk attributes that differ 
from those at the macroscale.93 In addition, and per-
haps not surprisingly given the nascence of the field, 
almost no literature exists on the long-term effects 
of nanomaterials in humans.94 All of these problems 
make it hard for an IRB to evaluate whether risks to 
subjects are reasonable and minimized. If IRB mem-
bers use their knowledge of risk assessment at larger 
scales, they may miss the special challenges involved 
in making nano risk evaluations.95
B. First-in-Human Research and Risk-Benefit 
Considerations
First-in-human (FIH) trials test new medical prod-
ucts in humans for the first time following preclinical 
bench and animal studies. The goal of these early FIH 
trials is not to demonstrate medical benefits, but to 
produce additional safety and efficacy data in a small 
population of human subjects. These additional data 
are used to support subsequent trials in larger pop-
ulations. A sponsor seeking to conduct an FIH trial 
of a product ultimately requiring FDA approval will 
need both FDA approval of an IND and IRB approval. 
In reviewing a proposal for FIH research, both the 
FDA and an IRB must first ask whether initiation of 
research on human subjects is acceptable. They then 
evaluate the risks and benefits of the protocol. In this 
section, we combine our discussion of FIH and risk-
benefit considerations for nanomedicine HSR because 
of their significant interrelation and because both are 
affected by the same central challenge of some nano-
medicine applications — uncertainty of risks and need 
for risk data.
The safe and ethical conduct of FIH and early-phase 
trials is important not only to protect the rights and 
welfare of human subjects, but also to protect research 
and innovation. A study or product may face signifi-
cant setbacks if it produces serious adverse effects 
(SAEs) or poorly received outcomes during an FIH or 
early-phase drug trial.96 The FDA requires drug tri-
als that proceed in phases, with each requiring IRB 
approval. Traditionally, sponsors have been expected 
to conduct Phase I, II, III, and sometimes post-mar-
ket Phase IV studies (though these phases are some-
times combined, as in Phase II/III trials).97 The FDA 
determines whether to approve the drug for market 
based on Phase III findings and may require sponsors 
to conduct Phase IV studies, post-market studies, to 
gather data about adverse effects. In 2006, the FDA 
added Phase 0 trials to the Phase I-IV scheme.98 In 
Phase 0 trials, a single small dose of the intervention 
under study is administered to a small pool of healthy 
subjects to determine whether its effects in humans 
match the effects anticipated from preclinical stud-
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ies.99 These Phase 0 trials present the greatest uncer-
tainty to human subjects in terms of risk.100 Thus, both 
Phase 0 trials (when used) and Phase I trials may be 
the context for launching FIH studies. 
The FDA and IRBs face protocols for FIH tri-
als of nanomedicine as new products are developed 
that incorporate more advanced, complex, and active 
nanostructures. The ability of both oversight entities 
to evaluate the acceptability of proposed FIH trials 
will be challenged by the current uncertainty as to the 
accuracy of preclinical animal and bench data in pre-
dicting human effects for some nanomaterials. Neces-
sary data sets that assist in setting proper health and 
safety guidelines are still lacking for many nanoma-
terials, including reliable in vitro and in vivo assays 
that accurately predict human responses and full doc-
umentation of nanoparticle interactions within the 
human body, including how particles are transported, 
metabolized, and excreted, and how they interact with 
human organs and human biological systems.101 Some 
analysts argue that the applicability of animal risk 
data to humans is limited at best, given the possibility 
of significant differences in how humans and animals 
metabolize some nanomaterials.102 This is especially 
true for nanomaterials that produce an immunogenic 
response, which may be considerably different in 
animals than in humans.103 For some nanomedicine 
applications for cancer treatment, the limitations of 
animal models may be even greater because the use of 
non-tumor-bearing animals in these studies ignores 
the ability of tumors to disrupt the blood-brain bar-
rier, allowing easier penetration by nanomaterials.104 
The limited duration of animal studies of nanoma-
terials may hamper assessment of long-term risks to 
humans, such as carcinogenicity, and animal studies 
delivering high doses in a short time frame may not 
produce results reflecting the effects of smaller doses 
over a longer time in humans.105 Further criticisms of 
the utility of animal studies to predict effects in HSR 
generally may be especially problematic in the context 
of some nanomedicine research. One such criticism 
is that, because of their small sample size and limited 
duration, animal studies only reveal the fastest, most 
pervasive, and most easily detectible adverse effects.106 
Differences may exist between animals and humans 
regarding how nanoparticles are processed through 
bodily systems or excreted; in mice larger nanopar-
ticles may tend to agglomerate, whereas the same par-
ticles could pass quickly through human systems.107 
Some nanoparticles may produce significantly delayed 
unintended secondary effects or immunologic, inflam-
matory, or carcinogenic effects as a result of the body 
retaining nanoparticles for a long period of time and 
breaking them down more slowly than large parti-
cles.108 Animal studies may not detect these effects.
These FIH issues blend into the larger issue of how 
the FDA and IRBs can reliably assess risks. While 
some nanomedicine protocols will use familiar and 
well understood nano-components (such as lipo-
somes, dendrimers, micelles, and proteins), others 
will use novel and complex nanomaterials with poorly 
understood risks. The range and complexity of ben-
efits, risks, and uncertainties are likely to increase in 
the future, as more applications incorporate active 
nanomaterials with properties that change through 
biological interactions and in response to environ-
mental triggers. 
Uncertainty surrounding the risks posed by some 
nanomedicine trials may raise additional ethical and 
oversight challenges. Informed consent may be diffi-
cult to get, as explanations of nanomedicine risks that 
are based on uncertain preclinical data may not do a 
In evaluating a proposed nanomedicine protocol, especially for an FIH trial, 
the FDA and relevant IRB should consider the adequacy of the preclinical 
data offered to support the appropriateness of undertaking human trials. They 
should consider the variety of animal and in vitro models used to assess risk, and 
whether they show consistent risk findings using different assessment methods; 
the potential for immunogenic and other biological reactions that may occur 
in humans but not in animals; small sample size and short duration in animal 
studies, that may result in difficulty in detecting rare or delayed adverse effects; 
the use of disproportionate dosing in animals to simulate long-term exposure 
effects; and whether the animal studies were randomized or blinded. 
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good job of communicating the real risks. Uncertainty 
about risks may also militate in favor of long-term 
monitoring of subjects, especially for nanomedicine 
applications with a potential risk of bioaccumulation 
or delayed or long-term effects. Yet long-term moni-
toring requires extended cooperation from research 
participants, thus raising more ethical complexities. 
One approach to assist the FDA and IRBs in 
addressing uncertainty in FIH trials and in risk-ben-
efit evaluation more generally is to establish a set of 
criteria to use in assessing the acceptability of risk. 
This approach has been used in HSR oversight for 
human gene transfer trials.109 Thus, NIH established 
Guidelines for investigators and oversight bodies.110 
Appendix M of these Guidelines, entitled “Points to 
Consider in the Design and Submission of Protocols 
for the Transfer of Recombinant DNA Molecules into 
One of More Human Research Participants,” provides 
a set of questions that investigators must answer and 
federal and institutional oversight bodies can use to 
guide evaluation of protocols. Appendix M and the 
associated NIH Guidelines articulate criteria to guide 
evaluation of a proposed protocol, including criteria 
pertaining to safety reporting, research design, antici-
pated risks and benefits, preclinical and risk assess-
ment studies, selection of human subjects, informed 
consent procedures and documents, and long-term 
follow-up.111 
Some commentators suggest that the NIH Guide-
lines have the potential to serve as a model for over-
sight in other areas of emerging research with uncer-
tain benefits and risks.112 Our research team found 
several aspects of this model potentially useful for 
oversight of nanomedicine HSR, especially the Points 
to Consider in Appendix M. Consequently, this model 
significantly influences our recommendations for the 
development of a nanomedicine points-to-consider 
document, explained in Part III.
We offer the following recommendations for how 
HSR oversight can address FIH trials and risk-benefit 
determinations in the context of nanomedicine:
1.  In evaluating a proposed nanomedicine pro-
tocol, especially for an FIH trial, the FDA and 
relevant IRB should consider the adequacy 
of the preclinical data offered to support 
the appropriateness of undertaking human 
trials. They should consider the variety of 
animal and in vitro models used to assess 
risk, and whether they show consistent risk 
findings using different assessment methods; 
the potential for immunogenic and other bio-
logical reactions that may occur in humans 
but not in animals; small sample size and 
short duration in animal studies, which may 
result in difficulty in detecting rare or delayed 
adverse effects; the use of disproportionate 
dosing in animals to simulate long-term expo-
sure effects; and whether the animal studies 
were randomized or blinded. They should also 
consider how closely preclinical studies match 
the proposed human protocol with respect 
to the composition of the intervention, the 
mode of administration, and other relevant 
variables.
2.  Where the reliability of preclinical studies is 
uncertain in predicting human risks, the FDA 
and IRBs should ask investigators to articu-
late the limitations of their preclinical 
models and to provide what data they have 
that support the reliability of the preclinical 
studies.
3.  The FDA and IRBs should carefully ana-
lyze protocols using nanomaterials with 
the potential to cause long-term or delayed 
adverse effects and potentially requiring 
ongoing monitoring. If such risks exist or 
if the potential for such risks is uncertain, 
researchers should be asked to disclose and 
address them in their informed consent 
documents. 
C. Informed Consent Considerations
As we have suggested, some nanomedicine HSR pres-
ents challenges for informed consent. The FDA rules 
on HSR and the Common Rule establish both general 
requirements for informed consent and additional fea-
tures that IRBs may require. The general requirements 
include explanations of foreseeable risks and benefits 
to the subject.113 Additional elements of informed con-
sent that may be required include a “statement that 
the…[intervention] may involve risks to the subject 
(or to the embryo or fetus, if the subject is or may 
become pregnant) which are currently unforesee-
able”; anticipated situations where the subject’s par-
ticipation may be terminated by the researchers; and 
a “statement that significant new findings developed 
during the course of the research which may relate to 
the subject’s willingness to continue participation will 
be provided to the subject.”114 These additional ele-
ments of informed consent may well prove germane 
to those nanomedicine trials investigating fundamen-
tally new interventions in FIH or Phase 0 or I trials. 
Indeed, findings that some nanomaterial may bioac-
cumulate in the gonads or demonstrate cytoxicity in 
gametes115 demonstrate the potential importance of 
considering whether a subject may become pregnant 
or a subject’s gametes may be used to conceive. 
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An additional challenge to informed consent in the 
context of some nanomedicine research may be the 
therapeutic misconception, a widely recognized prob-
lem that occurs when human subjects believe that 
they are receiving clinical care and fail to appreciate 
that they are participating in research with risks and 
potentially no therapeutic benefit.116 Studies indicate 
that the therapeutic misconception is pervasive in 
clinical trials;117 the current informed consent pro-
cess may not consistently ensure that human sub-
jects understand the nature of their participation in 
research.118 Some nanomedicine HSR may heighten 
the risk of the therapeutic misconception. When 
nanomedicine applications enter FIH and early-phase 
trials with varying levels of uncertainty as to potential 
risks to human subjects and the adequacy of preclini-
cal data to predict such risks, subjects may have dif-
ficulty grasping the dimensions of the risks they are 
assuming.119 In addition, a significant portion of nano-
medicine applications entering human trials focus on 
treating cancer, especially late-stage cancer or cancer 
that is difficult to treat using conventional therapeu-
tics. Subjects afflicted with serious or life-threatening 
conditions may cling to hope that participating in 
research will benefit them; this can result in the thera-
peutic misconception plus a willingness to accept high 
levels of risk.120 
Finally, some commentators have raised the ques-
tion of whether informed consent documents in nano-
medicine HSR should include disclosure that the 
intervention contains “nanoscale” components.121 The 
question of whether to use “nano-” in the informed 
consent process leads to consideration of how the 
public views nanotechnology.122 Public opinion seems 
to range from concern over the lack of specific regula-
tions for nanoproducts to support for greater invest-
ment in nanotechnology research and innovation.123 
One meta-analysis found that more members of the 
public associated nanotechnology with benefits than 
with risks, but that a sizeable minority was unsure.124 
One scholar argues that the public is likely to embrace 
nanomedicine products, based on evidence of positive 
public opinion toward biomedicine more generally.125 
However, others argue that if the public cannot tell 
whether a medical product contains nanomaterials, 
this will raise concerns about nanomedicine and result 
in negative public opinion.126 
The question of what to disclose in the informed 
consent process in the context of human subjects 
research is somewhat different than the more general 
question of labeling “nano” in products for consumers. 
In the context of HSR, the informed consent process 
is supposed to serve a crucial ethical function. Disclo-
sure must be robust in order to allow individuals to 
determine as an exercise of their autonomy whether 
to agree to undertake the risks and burdens of partici-
pation. Withholding information or terminology that 
might lead individuals to decline participation is dif-
ficult to defend. 
Because informed consent plays such a crucial func-
tion in HSR, we conclude that the informed consent 
process and document in nanomedicine HSR should 
indeed disclose that a study involves nanomateri-
als. Implementing this recommendation is challeng-
ing, given that defining “nano” remains a subject of 
debate,127 and not all sponsors using nanomaterials 
in their products state that. We suggest that at the 
very least, where the relevant documents (such as the 
research protocol) already use “nano” terminology, 
this should not be withheld from participants and 
should be included in the informed consent process 
and documents. Disclosure is important to engen-
dering public confidence in nanomedicine research 
and to ensuring that, in the event of a serious adverse 
event in a nanomedicine trial, the public does not feel 
deceived by researchers and does not react against 
nanomedicine research. However, when the relevant 
documents do NOT use “nano” terminology, what is 
likely to be most important ethically is to fully and 
accurately describe the intervention, its risks, and 
potential benefits, if any. This terminology issue in the 
informed consent process reinforces the importance 
of a coordinated, federally led process to clarify termi-
nology and what is embraced by “nanomedicine,” as 
we discussed above. 
We thus offer the following recommendations for 
addressing informed consent challenges raised by 
some nanomedicine research:
1.  Informed consent processes and documents 
should state when “nanoscale” interven-
tions are to be used in a protocol (at least 
when the relevant documents associated 
with the proposed trial use such “nano” ter-
minology) and should describe the relevant 
attributes of the intervention. Effectuating 
this recommendation will be aided by the 
work of the OSTP/OMB/USTR working group 
on terminology and our proposed HSR/N 
Working Group and SAC/N specifically on 
human subjects research issues. 
2.  IRBs should be aware of the risk of the 
therapeutic misconception in some nano-
medicine research. When reviewing nano-
medicine protocols, IRBs should scrutinize 
the proposed informed consent documents 
and procedures and, where necessary, recom-
mend changes to ensure clear communication 
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that the protocol constitutes research not 
clinical care, accurate description of risks, and 
appropriately cautious description of potential 
benefits, if any.
3.  IRBs should determine whether individual 
nanomedicine protocols call for additional 
elements of informed consent, as set forth in 
the FDA rules on HSR and the Common Rule, 
such as a statement that the protocol involves 
some risks that are unforeseeable (including 
risks to the subject or to an embryo or fetus, if 
the subject becomes pregnant or the subject’s 
gametes are used to conceive).
4.  IRBs should determine whether the 
informed consent processes and documents 
for individual nanomedicine protocols 
include adequate language on potential risks 
and implications of bioaccumulation, long-
term permanence, delayed adverse effects, and 
need for long-term monitoring of subjects.
D. Data-Monitoring Considerations
The Common Rule and FDA rules on IRB review of 
proposed HSR require that “[w]hen appropriate, the 
research plan makes adequate provision for monitor-
ing the data collected to ensure the safety of subjects.”128 
Evaluating the adequacy of such monitoring plans is a 
challenge for IRBs whenever there is uncertainty as to 
the type of risks that need monitoring. Yet monitoring 
is important when there is uncertainty about the types 
and degree of risk to human subjects. Given the poten-
tial for such uncertainty in some nanomedicine HSR, 
especially uncertainty about potential long-term or 
delayed adverse effects, data-monitoring is important. 
Because of the fast-evolving nature of nanomedicine 
and the paucity of data on long-term risks as well as 
risks associated with more complex and active materi-
als, data-monitoring is a significant tool to ensure that 
the lessons of early trials guide the design and review 
of later trials.
While IRBs play an important role in assessing the 
need for and the adequacy of monitoring plans, Data 
and Safety Monitoring Boards (DSMBs) often perform 
this monitoring function. FDA regulations require 
data-monitoring for all clinical trials of drugs, bio-
logics, and devices requiring IND or IDA approval.129 
DSMBs provide advice to sponsors about the ongo-
ing safety of their clinical trials.130 For both drugs and 
devices, sponsors must immediately terminate stud-
ies when data-monitoring reveals an “unreasonable 
risk to subjects.”131 DSMBs are typically only required 
for “large, randomized multisite studies that evaluate 
treatments intended to prolong life or reduce risk of a 
major adverse health outcome such as a cardiovascu-
lar event or recurrence of cancer.”132 Early-phase clini-
cal trials are generally not required to use DSMBs.133 
NIH requires DSMBs for all NIH-supported or 
conducted Phase III clinical trials and (where appro-
priate) for Phase I and II clinical trials that are 
multi-site, blinded, or involving high-risk interven-
tions or vulnerable populations.134 “The method and 
degree of monitoring needed is related to the degree 
of risk involved.”135 DSMBs can make recommenda-
tions for halting or modifying a trial because of risk 
concerns.136 
Because current practice does not require the use 
of DSMBs for early-phase clinical trials, many nano-
medicine trials at that stage may not use these data-
monitoring bodies. However, the use of DSMBs or 
other institutionally established committees with 
similar responsibilities can be a useful tool for gath-
ering data on uncertain risks in nanomedicine HSR 
trials. For example, a DSMB could monitor liver 
function data to assess bioaccumulation risks or 
inflammatory markers to identify an immunologic 
response. Performing such monitoring during the 
early trial phases can help ensure that subsequent 
trials are designed to minimize these risks. Such 
data can also provide valuable input for IRBs as they 
review the adequacy of a protocol’s research design, 
as well the need to revise informed consent docu-
ments and inform human subjects about new find-
ings of risk. 
Consequently, we recommend the following:
1.  The FDA should recommend the use of 
DSMBs (or another data-monitoring body 
with similar functions) for those nanomedi-
cine trials that present uncertain or particu-
larly significant risks, including for bioaccu-
mulation and delayed adverse effects. Data 
and findings from monitoring should be used 
not only to inform investigator and sponsor 
decisions, but also to inform FDA, NIH, and 
IRB approval processes. 
2.  In reviewing a nanomedicine protocol’s data-
monitoring plans, IRBs and DSMBs should 
consider the adequacy of the plan to detect 
potential long-term or delayed adverse 
reactions.
3.  IRBs should consider whether a particular 
nanomedicine protocol requires more fre-
quent data-reporting to a DSMB to ensure 
that risks and harms are quickly identified.
4.  IRBs and DSMBs should ensure that nano-
medicine protocols that present signifi-
cantly uncertain or serious risks to subjects 
provide clear triggers and procedures 
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for halting research in the event of serious 
adverse effects (SAEs).
5.  IRBs and DSMBs should ensure that pro-
tocol procedures include appropriate pro-
visions for prompt reporting of any unex-
pected serious adverse effects (SAEs) or 
research findings revealing a new significant 
risk to research participants. 
E. Considerations Beyond the Common Rule
Much remains to be understood about occupational, 
bystander, and environmental risks of nanomaterials. 
Research detailing health and environmental effects 
is limited.137 For instance, it remains unclear whether 
certain classes of nanomaterials pose a greater risk to 
workers, and whether nanomaterials in certain states 
(e.g., liquid or solid) pose greater risks of accidental 
exposure.138 After nanomaterials are shed by sub-
jects, how persistent are they in the community and 
environment? If a nanomaterial enters an ecosystem, 
what are the effects on organisms, populations, and 
the ecosystem itself? Such gaps in our knowledge are 
highlighted in the recent NRC report.139 Some nano-
medicine HSR raises occupational exposure con-
cerns for researchers and lab workers who may inhale 
nanoparticles or absorb them through their skin in the 
course of manufacturing, handling, or administering 
nanomedicine interventions.140 Bystanders (includ-
ing family members and close contacts of human sub-
jects) may also potentially be exposed to nanomateri-
als excreted or otherwise shed by subjects. Laboratory 
disposal practices, as well as excretion and shedding, 
can also release nanomaterials into the environment. 
Increasing our understanding and control of work-
place and environmental exposures is a significant 
goal of recent government strategies for nanomaterial 
risk management.141 
Consideration of occupational, bystander, and envi-
ronmental effects is beyond the traditional scope of 
IRB deliberation, as IRBs focus on the protection of 
human subjects themselves.142 Some commentators 
argue that consideration of these issues exceeds IRBs’ 
expertise and would overburden them.143 Because the 
HSR regulations do not provide guidance on these 
issues,144 some have argued that IRBs are not the right 
bodies to consider them.145 In the case of bystander 
risks, for example, the argument is that protection 
of bystanders is a public issue that should addressed 
by a policymaking body, not a review body such as an 
IRB.146 Yet bystander risks are important in deciding 
whether HSR is ethical.147 Indeed, some argue that 
investigators conducting HSR have an obligation to 
consider effects on bystanders.148
While IRBs are not tasked to oversee occupational, 
bystander, and environmental risks, there are other 
federal and institutional authorities that do provide 
relevant oversight. The occupational safety of lab 
workers and scientists, for example, is subject to over-
sight by OSHA, plus the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) and NIH, who have issued a 
joint Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical 
Laboratories (BMBL) manual.149 The BMBL manual 
provides guidance on laboratory practices, safety 
equipment, and facility design, as well as informa-
tion on specific microbiological agents relevant to lab 
worker safety.150 Under OSHA regulations, research 
institutions also convene laboratory safety committees 
(LSCs) responsible for ensuring the adequacy of safety 
training and the compliance of lab procedures with 
OSHA.151 These occupational safety oversight mecha-
nisms consider concerns raised by HSR, among many 
other activities. The CDC and NIH have already issued 
requirements that are specific to the use of nanoma-
terials in laboratories.152 OSHA too has addressed 
nanotechnology, indicating on its website that nano-
technology is subject to general OSHA standards.153 
NIOSH (an office under the CDC) is also already 
involved in nanotechnology-related occupational risk 
and safety assessment. In addition to identifying 10 
critical topic areas in nanotechnology for the purpose 
of “addressing knowledge gaps, developing strategies, 
and providing recommendations,”154 NIOSH has pro-
duced a number of guidance documents on safe han-
dling and monitoring of nanomaterials in the work-
place.155 NIOSH has also developed a Nanotechnology 
Information Library (NIL), an online database with 
information about nanomaterial properties and char-
acterization.156 Despite all of this work, some urge the 
need for additional oversight.157
Environmental health and safety is subject to over-
sight from the EPA. While EPA is already involved in 
the oversight of nanotechnology and nanomaterials, 
it plays a limited role with respect to environmen-
tal issues raised by HSR. Under 21 C.F.R. part 25, 
approval of clinical trials qualifies as a federal action 
requiring compliance with the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (NEPA),158 which requires preparation 
of an environmental impact statement with a finding 
of no significant environmental impact or the appli-
cability of one of several categorical exclusions. These 
exclusions apply broadly to almost all drug, device, 
biologic, and combination product approvals and 
are not written with any consideration for the hazard 
and risks that may be posed by some nanomaterials. 
Indeed, a categorical exclusion applies so long as the 
risk assessment concludes that the expected environ-
mental concentration of a drug will be less than 1 part 
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per billion.159 Given that nanomaterials may be more 
reactive than non-nano materials at smaller scales, 
this exclusion deserves scrutiny. 
The EPA is directly involved in overseeing certain 
HSR. EPA plays an active oversight role for human 
subjects research involving intentional dosing with 
pesticides.160 EPA has created a Human Studies 
Review Board (HSRB) “to provide independent advice 
and recommendations to EPA on issues related to the 
scientific and ethical review of research involving 
human subjects.” 161
Despite the involvement of these federal occupa-
tional and environmental oversight bodies in the 
area of nanotechnology and EPA’s involvement in 
some HSR, there has been little effort to integrate 
EHS analyses with HSR oversight generally, or in the 
domain of nanomedicine. However, one area of HSR 
oversight in which there is considerable integration of 
human subject concerns and occupational and envi-
ronmental considerations is rDNA research. Under 
the NIH Guidelines for rDNA research, protocols for 
HSR must be reviewed not only by an IRB, but also 
by a locally established Institutional Biosafety Com-
mittee (IBC) responsible for evaluating occupational, 
population, and environmental risks associated with 
the research.162 Some institutions have expanded the 
mandate of their IBCs to include other areas posing 
biosafety concerns.163 
IBCs are one candidate for a local body to take on 
the broader mission of considering those nanomedi-
cine research protocols found to raise safety concerns 
beyond human subjects themselves. IBCs can work 
with IRBs to integrate human subjects and broader 
concerns and to assess whether the risks of a proto-
col are acceptable. However, tasking IBCs to consider 
some nanomedicine protocols would require new guid-
ance. IBCs are governed by the NIH Guidelines, which 
address only rDNA research (as well as synthetic biol-
ogy starting in 2013) and offer only NIH guidance. To 
effectively address nanomedicine, IBCs would require 
nano-specific guidance analogous to that provided 
by the NIH Guidelines for rDNA research. Moreover, 
integration of NIH, FDA, EPA, and OSHA guidance 
would help coordinate consideration of the full range 
of issues.
We recommend creation of guidance and resources 
to allow IBCs (or equivalent local committees) to con-
sider occupational, bystander, and environmental 
concerns raised by nanomedicine protocols, in coor-
dination with IRBs and other local committees with 
relevant jurisdiction (such as lab safety committees). 
However, not all nanomedicine research poses occu-
pational, bystander, and environmental concerns. 
Consequently, we recommend that currently existing 
institutional committees trigger IBC review only for 
nanomedicine protocols that are identified as present-
ing significant uncertainty or concern with respect 
to occupational, bystander, or environmental issues. 
Identification of these cases of potential concern will 
be assisted by efforts, such as those of the National 
Research Council, to improve toxicological studies on 
engineered nanomaterials.
Consequently, we recommend that:
1.  Nanomedicine protocols submitted to IRBs 
should include data supporting the safety of 
HSR to workers, bystanders, and the envi-
ronment. Protocols should include descrip-
tions of clinical and laboratory practices for 
nanomaterial handling, containment, and dis-
posal, including disposal of biowastes contain-
ing nanomaterials.
2.  IBCs or equivalent committees should 
review those nanomedicine protocols that 
are identified by HSR approval bodies as 
presenting occupational, bystander, or 
environmental risks or significant uncer-
tainty with respect to these concerns. Such 
review should include consideration of the 
adequacy of data supporting occupational, 
bystander, and environmental safety and the 
adequacy of clinical and laboratory practices 
proposed.
3.  Review by an IBC or equivalent commit-
tee should take place concurrently with or 
before IRB review, to aid coordinated con-
sideration of whether nanomedicine research 
protocols should move forward.
4.  IBCs or equivalent committees should also 
provide their review findings to DSMBs to 
inform safety and monitoring decisions.
5.  Where risks to family members and close con-
tacts exist, IRBs should ensure that protocols 
provide adequate procedures for inform-
ing subjects of these risks, should consider 
whether bystanders should be informed of 
risks, and should consider how subjects and 
bystanders will be provided with informa-
tion and training to minimize risks.
Part III. A Flexible, Evolutionary Approach 
to Oversight
As more information becomes available about haz-
ards and risks associated with specific nanomedicine 
interventions, it may become necessary to increase or 
decrease oversight for different types of nanomedicine 
HSR. Protecting human subjects is a priority in HSR 
oversight. At the same time, avoiding significant costs 
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and barriers to innovation should be a priority as well. 
Consequently, we recommend a flexible, evolutionary 
approach to oversight that:
1.  Recognizes that not all nanomedicine 
interventions present the same risks and 
concerns for human subjects research 
protection;
2.  Establishes criteria for identifying those 
nanomedicine protocols that raise height-
ened concerns, potentially requiring addi-
tional analysis;
3.  Enables adaptive oversight that can evolve 
(both ratchet up and ratchet down) as knowl-
edge, data, and experience with nanomedicine 
interventions grow over time and the science 
and technology evolve; and
4.  Provides a coordinated framework for 
analysis and development of oversight mecha-
nisms, as well as for sharing of knowledge 
and information across federal agencies and 
offices, as well as institutional oversight 
bodies.
Instead of creating new regulation, this flexible 
approach will establish a process for identifying nano-
medicine HSR protocols that may require additional 
analysis and oversight. Where a need for additional 
oversight is identified, our approach can provide a 
coordinated approach across agencies and offices. As 
new knowledge and data emerge about nanothera-
peutics and in vivo nanodiagnostics, this can be used 
to inform the further evolution of oversight. 
We have recommended above that the linchpin 
of this evolutionary and adaptive approach to nano-
medicine HSR oversight be two complementary com-
mittees – an HSR/N Working Group for inter-agency 
coordination, advised by a SAC/N public committee 
of experts and other stakeholders. We recommend 
that they be placed in DHHS, where FDA, NIH, and 
OHRP (key oversight entities for HSR generally) 
reside. Membership in HSR/N should include repre-
sentatives from agencies and offices including OHRP, 
NIH, FDA, NIOSH, EPA, and OSHA. Concurrently 
with the formation of HSR/N, the Secretary of DHHS 
should create SAC/N and assemble experts and stake-
holders in nanomedicine to advise the Secretary and 
HSR/N.
HSR/N and SAC/N will fill a gap in the current fed-
eral oversight structure for nanotechnology, by add-
ing a capacity to consider the HSR issues. Both bodies 
should interact with the nanotechnology committees 
and offices that already exist. NSET is a subcommit-
tee of the National Science and Technology Coun-
cil’s (NSTC) Committee on Technology. NSET and 
the National Nanotechnology Coordination Office 
(NNCO) are responsible for coordinating planning, 
budgeting, and program implementation for NNI, 
a major federal effort to coordinate approaches to 
nanotechnology issues across 25 federal agencies. 
Another body, the President’s Council of Advisors 
on Science and Technology (PCAST), which reports 
at the Cabinet level, is responsible for evaluating the 
technical accomplishments of the NNI, recommend-
ing new goals and research areas, and suggesting 
budget changes. PCAST is also charged with issuing 
recommendations to the President about the NNI and 
broader nanotechnology policy. Indeed, PCAST issued 
a report in 2012 with recommendations to create uni-
fied strategies across agencies, promote information-
sharing, and increase contributions from experts 
outside the government.164 As noted above, NSET 
currently has four Working Groups: Global Issues in 
Nanotechnology; Nanotechnology Environmental 
and Health Implications; Nanomanufacturing, Indus-
try Liaison & Innovation; and Nanotechnology Public 
Engagement and Communications. 
The approach we recommend creates a home for 
the consideration of nanomedicine HSR issues within 
DHHS, the federal agency that houses the FDA, NIH, 
and OHRP, which are the primary federal regulators 
and oversight entities for human subjects research. 
(See Figure 6.) We should note that in recommending 
creation of an HSR/N Working Group, we are mindful 
that “working group” is often used federally to apply 
to interagency committees, whereas “task force” usu-
ally signifies intra-agency membership.165 There is a 
Where a need for additional oversight is identified, our approach can provide 
a coordinated approach across agencies and offices. As new knowledge  
and data emerge about nanotherapeutics and in vivo nanodiagnostics, this 
can be used to inform the further evolution of oversight.
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history of interagency working groups housed within 
DHHS, with participants across government.166 The 
Working Group would have membership from FDA, 
NIH, NIOSH, OHRP, and other appropriate DHHS 
offices, and representatives from offices and agencies 
outside of DHHS, such as NSET, EPA, OSHA, and 
NNI. 
In addition to the creation 
of HSR/N, we recommend the 
creation of SAC/N, made up of 
experts and public represen-
tatives to provide substantive 
input on nanomedicine ethical 
issues. DHHS already has a Sec-
retary’s Advisory Committee on 
Human Research Protections 
(SACHRP).168 SACHRP was 
formed in 2001 by then-Secre-
tary Thompson;169 the current 
Secretary of DHHS could order 
formation of SAC/N. SACHRP’s 
current charter allows SACHRP 
to consider any issue, but with 
emphasis on stated areas, which 
do not include nanomedicine HSR.170 This is why our 
group recommends an analogous committee, with 
membership providing nanomedicine HSR expertise. 
However, a subcommittee of SACHRP might suffice, 
so long as it has appropriately expert membership. 
Figure 7 depicts the organizational location of the two 
committees we recommend. 
Figure 6
Recommended Baseline and Exceptional Oversight for Nanomedicine167
Figure 7
Organizational Chart for the HSR/N Working Group and SAC/N
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SAC/N should be created as a public advisory body 
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).171 
FACA governs committees, boards, commissions, 
councils, and similar groups established to advise offi-
cers and agencies within the federal government.172 
FACA committees “are meant to provide independent, 
expert, and objective advice” on policy issues,173 and 
work by engaging both government and non-govern-
ment employees in a transparent, public forum.174 
Though controversy has occasionally erupted over 
FACA committee functioning, particularly regard-
ing the requirement of balance in points of view rep-
resented,175 a FACA committee would offer benefits 
for oversight of nanomedicine HSR. SAC/N would 
be subject to requirements in terms of membership, 
advance notice of meetings in the Federal Register, 
and meetings open to the public, unless statutorily 
allowed to be closed.176 Nanomedicine continues to 
be a controversial emerging area of technology, so an 
open and transparent forum for debate is highly desir-
able. NNI has also highlighted the need to integrate 
various shareholder views, in a way that promotes 
transparency.177 Current mechanisms to solicit and act 
on non-governmental expert advice are inadequate.178 
FACA committees provide the needed transparency 
and incorporation of stakeholders. SAC/N would also 
create shared governance among governmental enti-
ties, experts, and the public.179 SAC/N would bring 
to the table individuals well-versed on the science 
of nanomedicine. Nanomedicine is a quickly evolv-
ing field that demands involvement of top industry 
and academic experts to ensure the government is 
informed of new developments and trends with the 
science and within industry. 
SAC/N is needed, but is not enough to achieve 
nanomedicine HSR oversight that is effective. Simul-
taneous creation of an HSR/N Working Group will 
allow government officials to work behind closed 
doors and efficiently to evaluate regulatory recom-
mendations and enact changes as necessary. HSR/N 
can also facilitate regulations and promote informa-
tion-sharing mechanisms among agencies, offices, and 
centers, including on proprietary product informa-
tion. HSR/N can facilitate the sharing of information 
from various government databases on nanoparticle 
toxicity; while such databases have proliferated, meth-
ods of data-sharing are underdeveloped.180 Pairing a 
FACA committee with a regulatory working group or 
equivalent has been used elsewhere, such as in over-
sight of human gene transfer HSR, where the RAC 
has served as the FACA committee, while the FDA has 
housed regulatory decision-making.
HSR/N and SAC/N should initially serve three 
complementary functions with respect to nano-
medicine HSR, with a possible fourth function to be 
added later (see Figure 8). SAC/N’s activities under 
each function are closely modeled on the responsibil-
ities given to SACHRP under its charter (suggesting 
again that SAC/N might also exist as a subcommittee 
of SACHRP, as opposed to an independent entity.) 
These three initial functions should be ongoing and 
should evolve over time. In performing the analytical 
function, HSR/N should lead and coordinate iden-
tification and analysis of nanomedicine HSR issues. 
This should begin with consideration of how best to 
define or describe nanomedicine protocols of poten-
tial concern; we recommend the approach to defi-
nition/description presented in Part I of this paper. 
HSR/N may also benefit from interaction with the 
new OSTP/OMB/USTR working group established 
by memo dated June 2011, as discussed above.181 
That working group “will coordinate an approach 
and choice of terminology relevant to the regulation 
and oversight of nanomaterials,” will “develop this 
framework,” and will “enable…agencies to…influence 
ongoing research into nanotechnology”;182 this sug-
gests that the new agency will spearhead the kind of 
scientific research needed to generate science-based 
regulation. Yet because this memo devotes no atten-
tion to human subjects research issues, the creation 
of HSR/N devoted to those issues will generate an 
opportunity for fruitful interaction between the new 
working group and HSR/N on human subjects issues 
as well as EHS issues more generally. The analytical 
work of HSR/N and SAC/N should progress to how 
best to analyze and synthesize data. HSR/N should 
lead these evaluations in a coordinated way across 
agencies and offices and also identify and formulate 
plans for conducting analysis of different character-
istics and categories of nanoproducts and research, 
whereas SAC/N should review the work of OHRP 
and other agencies regulating nanomedicine HSR. 
SAC/N should also serve as a forum to collect input 
from the public and other stakeholders outside of 
the government regarding nanomedicine regulation 
and help keep the public informed of governmental 
activities.
In performing the advisory function, HSR/N should 
coordinate development of an interagency document 
on “Points to Consider in the Design and Submission 
of Protocols for Research of Nanotherapeutics and 
In Vivo Nanodiagnostics in Human Research Par-
ticipants,” as well as provide advice to federal agen-
cies as they develop regulations and oversight. This 
Points-to-Consider document should aim to generate 
data that will aid development of a science-based and 
ethical approach to nanomedicine HSR, while guid-
ing and coordinating analysis by the federal and insti-
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tutional bodies involved in HSR oversight. SAC/N 
should consult with and provide advice to the Secre-
tary, through the Assistant Secretary for Health, on 
matters pertaining to continuance and improvement 
of functions regarding nanomedicine human subjects 
research. Each of the agencies participating in HSR/N 
work should bring to development of this document 
its concerns and informational needs. Relevant por-
tions of this Points-to-Consider document should 
provide guidance to institutional review bodies such 
as IRBs, IBCs, and DSMBs as to issues they should 
consider in performing their reviews and approvals 
of nanomedicine research protocols. The document 
should also provide guidance to investigators as to the 
information they should supply to aid evaluation of 
the safety and ethics of nanomedicine HSR, in light of 
FDA and Common Rule HSR regulations.
Our recommendations for this Points-to-Consider 
document are influenced by Appendix M of the NIH 
Guidelines, created by the RAC to aid review of gene 
therapy and rDNA protocols.183 Appendix M, entitled 
“Points to Consider in the Design and Submission of 
Protocols for the Transfer of Recombinant DNA Mole-
cules into One of More Human Research Participants,” 
structures investigator applications for review, while 
the body of the NIH Guidelines provides guidance to 
both investigators and federal and institutional over-
sight bodies to aid analysis of proposed protocols for 
human gene transfer research. Nancy King has sug-
gested that the RAC and associated Guidelines can 
indeed serve as a model for oversight of other areas of 
emerging research with uncertain benefits and risks.184 
Figure 9 identifies issues that the HSR/N Points-
to-Consider document should address, at a minimum. 
Some of these issues are derived from the Points to 
Consider in Appendix M of the NIH Guidelines. Oth-
ers derive from our analysis in this article. 
The information review function means that 
HSR/N should serve as a forum for involved agen-
cies to discuss and share new knowledge and trends 
of concern to nanomedicine HSR, including SAEs, 
that they have identified through their individual 
data-submission processes, research activities, and 
data-monitoring efforts. Additionally, as part of the 
information review process, HSR/N should facilitate 
cross-agency sharing of information about SAEs and 
other issues in nanomedicine research. Knowledge 
gained through this information review process should 
Figure 8
Functions of the HSR/N Working Group and SAC/N
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Figure 9
Outline of Proposed Points to Consider in the Design and Submission of Protocols for Research on 
Nanotherapeutics and In Vivo Nanodiagnostics in Human Participants
Points-to-Consider Content Recommendations
Procedural Guidance on  
Protocol Submission, Review 
& Reporting
Review by FDA •  FDA should review nanomedicine research protocols in accordance with its appropriate  
review pathway. 
•  FDA Centers (e.g., CDER, CBER) should identify safety issues (e.g., permanence, delayed  
effects) that may require additional consideration by IRBs, DSMBs (or similar), and bodies  
responsible for occupational and environmental review (including appropriately tasked IBCs).
Review by NIH •  SRGs should identify any safety issues that require additional consideration by institutional 
review bodies.
Submission of data, monitoring, 
and adverse event reporting
•  FDA and NIH should flag potential need for IRBs to request additional preclinical data or more data 
safety monitoring, if uncertain risks exist or potential for long-term or delayed effects in humans. 
•  SAE reports and new findings of risk should include type and use of the nano-intervention 
and the nanomaterial characteristics that give rise to the risk.
Safety monitoring •  Investigators, DSMBs, and other institutional data-monitoring bodies should conduct ongoing 
safety monitoring when a nanomedicine protocol is identified by FDA, NIH, or an IRB as  
presenting potential long-term risks to human subjects or significant uncertainty as to risk.
Substantive Guidance 
Describing the use of nano in the 
research protocol
•  Protocols should include an explanation of the purpose of using nanomaterials.
Appropriate considerations for 
research design and for anticipat-
ing risks and benefits
•  Protocols should describe how the research design minimizes risks to human subjects, and 
mechanisms for detecting harms and adverse events during the research.
Adequate preclinical and risk-
assessment studies, including 
animal studies
•  Protocols should describe the preclinical research evidence, showing acceptability of  
research in humans and justification for the adequacy of preclinical studies. 
•  Protocols should identify the animal models used, the sample size of animals tested, the duration 
of animal studies, whether the studies were blinded or randomized, and whether the studies used 
different formulations, dosing, and administration routes than the protocol for human research.
Considerations for  
appropriate laboratory  
procedures in research
•  Protocols should describe laboratory procedures and demonstrate their adequacy for  
providing worker safety. 
•  OSHA and EPA should issue guidance for institutional bodies responsible for occupational 
and environmental review on appropriate nanomaterial contaminant and exposure levels that 
should be demonstrated by a protocol’s containment and waste disposal practices, and  
guidance on the requirements for demonstrating adequate facilities and investigator and 
worker safety training.
Public health considerations •  Protocols should describe and address mitigation of occupational, bystander, or environmental risks.
Selection of human subjects •  Select subjects in accordance with regular practice and IRB requirements.
Occupational, bystander, and  
environmental considerations 
•  Protocols should include information and data demonstrating minimized and reasonable risks 
to workers, bystanders, and the environment. 
•  Protocols should include descriptions of clinical and laboratory practices for nanomaterial 
handling, containment, and disposal, including of biowaste. 
•  Protocols identified by oversight bodies (i.e., FDA, SRGs, or IRBs) as presenting risks should be 
reviewed by appropriate institutional authorities tasked with addressing occupational, bystander, 
or environmental concerns, including consideration of adequacy of data supporting occupational, 
bystander, and environmental safety and adequacy of clinical and laboratory practices related to 
the handling, containment, and disposal of nanomaterials and biowaste containing nanomaterials. 
•  Such review should take place concurrently with or before IRB review so as to contribute to 
IRB determination of whether to approve the research protocol. Review findings should be 
provided to DSMBs and other institutional monitoring bodies to inform safety and monitor-
ing decisions. Where risks to bystanders exist, IRBs should ensure that protocols provide 
adequate procedures for informing those at risk and providing them with necessary informa-
tion and training to minimize such risks.
nanodiagnostics and nanotherapeutics • winter 2012 743
Recommendations for Nanomedicine HSR
inform the analytic and advisory functions over time. 
SAC/N should review the work and plans of HSR/N 
pertaining to information review, and should moni-
tor challenges that IRBs and their institutions face in 
reviewing and conducting nanomedicine research. In 
addition, SAC/N should also coordinate with NSET 
to gather new findings and information that might 
assist in completion of its own analytical and advisory 
functions.
A fourth possible function may be added later if 
needed. A protocol reviewing function should only be 
established if, in the course of the other three func-
tions, it is determined that some nanomedicine pro-
tocols present risks that are complex and significant 
enough to require additional protocol review beyond 
that available in baseline HSR review. HSR/N should 
determine if a protocol reviewing function is neces-
sary and coordinate the formation of such a process. 
SAC/N would provide a forum for public discussion 
and input into the formation process. One possible 
model for such protocol review could be the RAC 
model for gene transfer research using rDNA. 
The use of HSR/N to coordinate across agencies on 
nanomedicine and the use of SAC/N to ensure expert 
and stakeholder input should reap benefits for all of 
the agencies and offices involved in nanomedicine 
HSR and its oversight, across the federal government 
and individual institutions. This approach can thus 
reduce the burden on each federal oversight body to 
identify and analyze areas of concern in nanomedi-
cine research and can coordinate the approaches 
of diverse agencies. This can reduce both the risk of 
duplication of efforts and the risk that some oversight 
needs go overlooked. Second, it can reduce the risk of 
shortsighted regulations that may add significant but 
potentially unnecessary financial and time hurdles to 
innovation. At the same time, HSR/N can advance 
coordination between federal and local institutional 
oversight bodies for HSR/N while keeping the public 
well informed of progress through SAC/N. The work 
of these bodies can increase the likelihood that federal 
and local bodies are operating in synchrony. 
Finally, this flexible approach to oversight provides 
a potential model for oversight of other areas of HSR 
involving emerging science and technology. Instead 
of leaving thousands of local IRBs on their own to 
evaluate fast-evolving and challenging science and 
technology, our proposal creates a home for analysis 
and advice. Instead of leaving multiple federal agen-
cies with overlapping responsibilities for overseeing 
HSR without means to coordinate, pool data, and 
resolve conflicting approaches, we suggest a pathway 
to harmonization. Instead of maintaining the fiction 
that the acceptability of an HSR protocol raises unre-
lated issues of participant, occupational, bystander, 
and environmental safety, we suggest how to face the 
reality that a protocol’s acceptability depends on ade-
quate safety and risk management on all four fronts. 
Lastly, instead of suggesting that there is a bright line 
separating science whose HSR protocols need only 
“baseline” review from science whose protocols need 
“exceptional” review, we set up a flexible and evolu-
tionary way to begin to distinguish individual proto-
cols needing more intensive review. The goal is to set 
up an analytic process that is science-based, careful 
about the distinction between hazard and risk, capa-
ble of distinguishing individual protocols of concern, 
and thoroughly grounded in the established ethical 
standards guiding human subjects research in the 
United States. 
Provisions for early termination 
of research
•  IRBs and DSMBs should ensure that nanomedicine protocols that present uncertain or seri-
ous risks to subjects provide clear triggers and procedures for halting research in the event 
of unanticipated adverse effects.
Informed Consent – Added 
Elements, as Necessary
Risk of or opportunity for early 
termination
•  Informed consent processes and documents should tell subjects under what circumstances 
their participation in the research may be terminated without consent, including a statement 
that the subject will be informed of any significant new findings in the course of the research 
that may affect his or her decision to continue participating.
Reproductive considerations •  Informed consent processes and documents should disclose potential reproductive risks (if any).
Long-term follow-up •  Informed consent processes and documents should inform research participants if they may 
be required to submit to follow-up and monitoring beyond the duration of the trial.
Notification of previous subjects 
tested
•  Informed consent processes and documents should inform participants how many individuals 
have been part of previous clinical trials with the same drug or intervention.
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Conclusion
Federal and institutional oversight bodies are already 
facing protocols for HSR involving nanotherapeutics 
and in vivo nanodiagnostics. Some of these nano-
medicine protocols raise ethical and safety concerns 
for human subjects, workers, bystanders, and the 
environment. Many of these concerns are associated 
with the current lack of knowledge and certainty as to 
the risks of some nanomaterials to humans, which can 
vary depending on the type of nanomedicine appli-
cation in question. Consequently, HSR oversight of 
nanomedicine requires an approach that (1) differenti-
ates between nanomedicine applications that present 
plausible, significant risks and those that do not, (2) 
provides adequate safety and ethical protections while 
avoiding unnecessary hurdles to innovation, and (3) is 
flexible and evolutionary, allowing for new knowledge 
and data about nanomedicine to inform analysis and 
oversight over time. 
The most important feature of our recommenda-
tions is that we urge creation of a home for analysis 
of HSR issues in nanomedicine. Federal and private 
investment in nanotechnology is in the billions of dol-
lars per year. The federal government has rightly cre-
ated an impressive array of offices dedicated to analy-
sis of nanotechnology issues and formulation of sound 
policy, from NNI to NSET and its working groups. 
Yet nowhere in this structure or in any agency is there 
currently a central home for coordinating analysis of 
human subjects research issues. This should be fixed, 
with creation of an HSR/N Working Group and Sec-
retary’s Advisory Committee on Nanomedicine under 
DHHS. Progress in nanomedicine, with its enormous 
potential for human benefit, depends on the willing-
ness of individuals to participate in human subjects 
research and their confidence that the ethics of human 
subjects research will be maintained, especially in 
the face of uncertainty and fast-moving science. Our 
nation’s investment in nanotechnology and nanomed-
icine must be matched by investment in coordinated, 
sound, and effective oversight for the human subjects 
research essential to advance this burgeoning and 
high-impact field.
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